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NO WATER FOR THE WOODS: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF UNITED
STATES V. NEW MEXICO
SALLY K. FAIRFAX*

and
A. DAN TARLOCK**
I. INTRODUCTION
In the West, the availability of water determines the value of
land. The law of prior appropriation was developed to encourage
private and public entities to acquire and exercise rights to use
water on riparian and non-riparian land. In return for this extensive
privilege of capture, the holder of a water right is expected to act as
a rational economic maximizer, as defined by the custom of the
region. A vested water right depends on the continuous application
of water to a beneficial use.' If the use ceases or is excessively
wasteful, the right is lost or reduced in quantity, and the water is
thus made available to other, presumably more efficient, users.'
Those familiar with western water law are aware of substantial
qualifications to each of these statements, but the qualifications do
not diminish the power of these generalizations to establish the
background for the problem with which this article is concerned.
That problem is the tension between the states' power to determine
how western waters and lands will be allocated among competing
uses and the federal government's rights to preempt, at least partially, state allocations. The tension between state-based and potentially inconsistent federal allocations arises out of the federal
government's reserved rights claims under the Property and
Supremacy Clauses of the federal constitution. State water law is
vitally concerned with changing land use patterns and the impact of

*Assistant Professor, College of Natural Resources, University of California,
Berkeley. A.B., 1965, Hood College; M.A., 1969, New York University; M.A. Ph.D.,
1974, Duke University.
*Professor of Law, School of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington; Visiting
Professor of Law, Spring and Winter Quarters, University of Chicago School of Law
1979. A.B., 1963; L.L.B., 1965, Stanford University.
1. "The right is a practical one. It is not a personal right or an incident of land
ownership to be exercised at will; for if the water is not used, the right never comes
into existence; and if it is once used, the right can be lost if the use is discontinued."
MAXIFIELD, DIETERICH & TRELEASE, NATURAL RESOURCES ON INDIAN LANDS 209 (1977).

2. E.g., Erickson v. Queen Valley Ranch Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 578, 99 Cal. Rptr.
466 (Ct. App. 1971).
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these changes on the allocation of the state's waters.3 Despite the
Supreme Court's recognition of federal rights for over three quarters
of a century, western states have always been surprised when the
largest land holder in the West, the federal government, acts rationally and seeks to apply water arising on public lands to enhance
the use of lands it owns. The surprise and anger of the western
states at the federal government's assertion of appurtenant water
rights has found its way into the results and reasoning of two important 1978 Supreme Court decisions dealing with federal-state water
conflicts, California v. United States4 and United States v. New
Mexico.5
United States v. New Mexico is the first Supreme Court opinion
to confront directly the question of when a federal land management
agency may assert the implied intent of Congress to reserve appurtenant water rights when public land is withdrawn from entry.
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that the Forest
Service could not claim reserved rights for the preservation of instream flows as well as for recreation and stockwatering. At issue
was the implied intent of Congress in passing the 1891 Creative Act 6
and the 1897 Organic Administration Act.7 Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, followed conventional historical wisdom
in the assertion that both acts exclude aesthetic and environmental
considerations from forest reserve management. Thus, the Court
concluded that the reservation of water for instream flow preservation and recreation was not intended by Congress in 1891 and 1897
because such uses were inconsistent with the original purpose of the
forest reserves. A similar analysis was made of the stockwatering
claim.
This article examines the implications of United States v. New
Mexico and the likelihood of future federal-state water conflicts arising out of reserved right claims by federal land managers. We urge
an alternative reading of the legislative history and a different approach to reserved rights problems. Our reading of the background
of the two acts and other relevant legislation convinces us that the
3. See, e.g., United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota Water Conservation
Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976) which holds that the "public trust" imposed on
the state's waters requires the consideration of the impact of coal production-related
appropriations on future water needs.
98 S.Ct. 2985 (1978).
4.
U.S. -,
5.
__
U.S. -'
98 S.Ct. 3012 (1978).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 471 (1976) [hereinafter cited as the 1891 Act]. Although generally
called the "Creative Act" in Forest Service usage, the provision was actually passed as
the twenty fourth of twenty four sections in the General Land Law Revisions of 1891.
26 Stat. 1095, 1103 (1891).
7. 16 U.S.C. §§ 473 et seq. (1976). The "Organic Act" was passed as an amendment to an appropriations bill. 30 Stat. 11 (1897).
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1891 Act authorizing forest reservations was intended simply to
preserve the forests. The early forest reserves were conceptually
and administratively indistinguishable from early park reservations.
The 1897 Act altered the 1891 concept only to the extent that it
authorized the secretary to regulate permitted uses consistent with
the primary purpose of the forest reservations. Seen in this light,
the Court's construction of the two acts is arguably wrong because
the reservation of water for instream uses is consistent with the
original purpose of the reserves.
Part II of the article traces the evolution of state claims to exclusive control of western waters. Part III sketches the belated
recognition of federal claims and their impact on state allocation
systems. Part IV analyzes United States v. New Mexico, and Part V
presents an alternative reading of the legislative history. Part VI
concludes the article with an analysis of the impact of the decision
for federal land managers and permittees.
II. THE "STATES RIGHTS" ARGUMENT
A. Historical Roots of the Expectation of State Control
Western states have always been acutely aware that the federal
government's ownership of the public domain is the source of all
land and water titles. The law of prior appropriation was developed
on the assumption, which turned out to be wrong, that federal land
ownership would be temporary and that in the interim, pending
disposal, the federal government would claim no water rights as a
riparian landowner. This was a reasonable assumption during the
formative period of western water law,. 1850-1890. The principal
federal interests in the public domain were initially fiscal and, later,
redistributive! s The public domain was seen as an asset to be disposed
of, first to retire the revolutionary war debt, and later to encourage
settlement and "internal improvements" through land grants to
states, corporations and homesteaders.
On the expectation that the federal government would eventually
dispose of all the public domain, the states developed theories of
state sovereignty over waters arising on the public domain. The
states first tentatively asserted that the federal government had acquiesced in state-created water rights before the federal government or a federal patentee asserted any interest in waters arising
on the public domain. Then, they boldly asserted that the federal
government had ceded all power to allocate western waters to the
states by severing the waters from the land it retained. Through
this line of reasoning, the western states were able to argue that
the United States had no interest, apart from navigation protection,
8. The leading historians are P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW
DEVELOPMENT (1968); B. HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES (1924); R.
ROBBINS, OUR LANDED HERITAGE

(1942).
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in western waters.' Many state constitutions asserted "ownership"
of the waters within their boundaries, but the states were never
clear whether ownership meant proprietary ownership or whether
the term was used merely as a shorthand way of asserting the
state's police power over resources within its jurisdiction."°
State theories of exclusive sovereignty based on a federal cession of interest were necessary in order to eliminate the possibility
of the subsequent assertion of latent federal rights. The federal
government owns the public domain both as a proprietor and as a
sovereign." This dual ownership makes the federal government both
an ordinary landowner and one with the power to assert superior
property rights against those claiming under an inferior sovereign.
As a landowner, the Property Clause of the federal constitution entitles the federal government to use a share of navigable and nonnavigable waters arising on the public domain.'2 As a superior
sovereign, the Supremacy Clause entitles the federal government to
have its needs satisfied before others can use the water. The exercise of both clauses is required to explain the doctrine in the West.
The Property Clause explains why the federal government owns
rights superior to some state rights, for unless the federal government owned something, the Supremacy Clause alone only allows the
federal government to expropriate state-created rights after paying
just compensation. The Supremacy Clause explains only why there
is no balancing of federal and state interests in determining the
scope of federal reserved rights." In short, reserved rights are
riparian rights plus.
Because the federal government had the power to establish a
federal law of water rights, the great western resource guardians,
9. One of the best summaries of the states' arguments is Note, Control of
Western Waters, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 967 (1960).
10. Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALIF. L.
REV. 639 (1957).
11. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
12. Of course, the United States, with respect to the lands owned by it
throughout the western territories, has a status at least equal to that of a
riparian proprietor of private lands .... In other words, the only pre-existing
body of water rights from which the United States can carve out and reserve
when it sets aside land for a specific use are the riparian rights created by
the common law upon its extension to the western territories.
Keichel & Green, Riparian Rights Revisited: Legal Basis for Federal Instream Flow
Rights, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 969, 971, 973 (1976).
13. Dean Trelease argues that the Supremacy Clause not the Property Clause
is the correct constitutional basis of the reserved rights doctrine. "Reserved rights
stem from the supremacy clause and the need for water to carry out federal
functions." F. Trelease, Federal-StateRelations in Water Law, NATIONAL WATER COM.
MISSION STUDY No. 5 at 147 (1971). Under the Trelease theory, reserved rights are not
limited to Desert Land Act states because any reservation of land is a potential notice
of intent to appropriate. Support for this theory can be found in Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976), which refused to apply a balance of convenience doctrine to
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such as Mr. Justice Field and Samuel Weil, 4 always recognized that
state arguments, maintaining western waters were free from federal
rights, were wrong. Mr. Justice Field realized that at some future
time the federal government might assert its rights, and he sought
to accomodate the law of state claims-built on custom alone-with
federal claims by legitimating what had taken place in order to
foreclose the retroactive assertion of federal claims.15 Not only did
the federal government adopt this approach but it waited until long
after the state-created law of prior appropriation had taken root to
assert its interests. The expectation of non-retroactive assertion
ripened into one of non-prospective assertion as well. Despite the
familiar doctrine that the sovereign cannot be estopped to assert its
powers, the federal government's prior inaction in asserting it
claims makes it politically-and legally-painful to achieve a current
accomodation, as President Carter discovered after the initial drafts
of his 1977 water policy were released. Although the accomodation

the federal government once a congressional intent to reserve a sufficient quantity of
water to carry out the purpose of the reservation was established. Professor E. Hanks
strongly argues that Dean Trelease is wrong because the federal government's
power to displace state created rights in Desert Land Act states depends on a theory
of federal ownership of something. In brief, her argument is that (1) in the West the
federal government does in fact "own" something in trust for the public, (2) this
"ownership" is a source of power to displace subsequent state-created rights in Desert
Land Acts states, and (3) of course the United States can acquire water in non-Desert
Land Act states, but the Supremacy Clause analysis alone does not answer the hard
question: must the federal government pay when state-created rights are displaced?
E. HANKS, FEDERAL STATE RIGHTS AND RELATIONS, 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §

102.1 (R. Clark ed. Supp. 1978).
14. See S. WIEL, 1 WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES §§ 88-93 (3d ed. 1911).
15. A recent and perceptive evaluation of Mr. Justice Field's contribution to
the development of natural resources while sitting as a justice of the California
Supreme Court is McCurdy, Stephen J. Field and Public Land Law Development in
Californi, 1850-66. A Case Study of Judicial Resource Allocation in Nineteenth
Century America, 10 L. & Soc'y REV. 235 (1975). McCurdy argues that Field aggressively and imaginatively applied local customs to potentially federal claims and
"effectively brought federal land-use policy into the realm of private, and in some instances constitutional law." Id. at 264. Field's genius lay in his constant recognition
that California decisions fashioning a law from the "de facto delegation of federal
authority" would utlimately have to be valididated by the federal government."
History proved Mr. Justice Field correct for the Mining Act of 1866, discussed infra at
notes 21 to 27 did this.
In Boggs v. Merced, 14 Cal. 374 (1861), Mr. Justice Field decided a conflict between a leasee of John C. Freemont, claiming under a federal patent confirming a
Mexican land grant, and one who simply entered and began mining. For the price of
$50,000.00, it is alleged [C. SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 86
(1969 ed.)l Field held for Biddle Boggs on the ground that the federal government owned
the minerals and could dispose of them. To the Merced Mining Company's argument
that federal forebearance amounted to a license to grab, he answered that "the supposed
license from the federal government, then to work the mines on the public lands, consists in its simple forebearance. Any other license is a mere assertion, and is untrue in
fact and unwarranted in law."
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of federal and state interests must take place against the long
history of federal deference to state water law and the expectations
which have grown up around its desuetude, some accomodations
must be made to allow the federal government to fulfill its
trusteeship of the retained public lands. To determine the constraints which control any accomodation, it is necessary to consider
the states' argument that they are free from federal rights.
B. A Faulty Constitutional Theory Seemingly Confirmed
by Waiver
The argument that the federal government could have established
a federal water law does not establish the superiority of federal
claims, for the states have long maintained that any federal rights
have been waived. The states make both a general and a specific
waiver argument. They argue, for example, that they acquired exclusive sovereignty and proprietary ownership under the equal
footing doctrine.'" This argument is faulty for two reasons. First, the
original states did not own their waters in a proprietary sense," and
second, the equal footing doctrine guarantees only political, not
economic, equality.' 8 Nevertheless, although the equal footing doctrine as a basis for state sovereignty is now discredited, it continues
to echo in modern opinions. In California v. United States, Mr.
Justice Rehnquist quoted the Holmes dictum, "[t]he life of the law is
not logic but experience,"' 9 and began his discussion of the
background of federal-state relations, observing with obvious approval "One school of legal commentators held the view that, under
the equal footing doctrine, the western states, upon their admission
to the Union, acquired exclusive sovereignty over the unappropriated waters in their streams."2
The stronger states rights argument is that three acts from
1866 to 1877 constitute a specific waiver of any federal claims. The
strongest basis for this specific waiver is the Mining Act of 1866,"
which provides that "whenever, by priority of possession, rights to
the use of water for mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other
purposes, have vested or accrued, and the same acknowledged by
local customs, laws, and the decision of local courts, the possessors
16. Equal footing doctrine provides that new states are admitted to the Union
with the same political rights as existing states.
17. Martz & Grazis, Interstate Transfers of Water and Water Rights-The
Slurry Issue, 23 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 33, 45 (1977).

18.

E. Morreale (now Hanks), Federal-State Rights and Relations § 102.6

WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS (R. Clark, ed. 1967).

19.
- U.S.
-,98 S.Ct. 2985, 2987 (quoting 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1
(1881)). Mr. Justice Rehnquist went on to observe "so it may be said that the life of law
is not political philosophy but experience." Id.
20. Id. at 2990.
21. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (1866).
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and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and protected
in the same."22 The legislative history of the Act of 1866 is scant, but
its purpose seems limited to assuring protection to claims based on
the actual application of water to a beneficial use prior to 1866.22
Such an act was necessary because the federal government did not
assert its rights to the public domain during the Civil War, although
in theory all miners and other water users were simply trespassers
on the public domain." The Act of 1866 was probably designed to do
no more than carry forward the traditional public domain policy of
confirming squatters rights after the fact, and the leading Supreme
Court decisions interpreting the Act treat it as confirming rights
vested prior to 1866 rather than as renouncing all future federal
rights. 5
This legislation validated the accomodation between the
theoretical claims of the federal government as landowner and the
mounting expectations of miners, ranchers and the new states
whose economy was based on these expectations and worked out by
Mr. Justice Field while sitting on the California Supreme Court.
Subsequent legislation enacted in 1870" and 1877" did little
more than reaffirm the 1866 solution to those who had entered the
public domain to grab and prosper. The Desert Land Act of 18778
does contain broader language which has been interpreted by the
22. Id.
23. A recent article reviewing the legislative history of the Act of 1866 and two
subsequent acts concludes that what evidence is available indicates that Congress intended no blanket severence of whatever rights the federal government owned, and
that the extent of state control over federal waters contemplated by the acts is
unclear because the issue was never addressed. Grow & Stewart, The Winters Doctrine as Federal Common Law, 10 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 457 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Grow & Stewart].
24. The great Samuel Wiel stated that the Act of 1866 was "not a formal
grant" but rather " a declaration that the courts and the people had been correct in
spite of the fact . . ." that the federal government had a superior claim.
25. The Court first enforced the law of prior appropriation between conflicting
appropriators in Atchison v. Peterson, 87 U.S. 507 (1874); Basey v. Gallagher, 87 U.S.
670 (1874); Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453 (1878). In 1879, the Court applied the Act to
uphold the claim of a prior appropriator, claiming under state law, against a subsequent federal patantee. Mr. Justice Miller explained: "We are of the opinion that the
section of the ict . . . was rather a voluntary recognition of a pre-existing right of
possession, constituting a valid claim to its continued use, than the establishment of a
new one." Broder v. Water Co., 101 U.S. 274, 276 (1879). These cases do no more than
adopt what has become known as the California theory of appropriation. The California
theory bases all water rights on the federal government's ownership of the public domain and rationalizes the state's power to create rights on a federal grant. This theory
recognizes, however, the power of the federal government to assert rights against
future claimants.
26. Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, 16 Stat. 217 (1879).
27. Desert Land Act, ch. 197, 19 Stat. 377 (1877).
28. Id.
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Supreme Court as a blanket severance. 29 An analysis of the
legislative history of the 1877 Act, which the court has never made,
indicates, however, that the new language was intended only to reaffirm the 1866 legislation and to insure that early Desert Land Act
patentees did not monopolize available supplies of water to the exclusion of future entrants."0 Thus, the severance theory rests on the
strength of the Act of 1866 and fails because the federal government
never relinquished all assertable rights over its water resources.
III. FEDERAL CLAIMS ARISE
A. The Origin of the Reserved Rights Doctrine
Not until after the states developed a complete system of water
rights based on the assumption that no federal interest would ever
be asserted in water allocation did the federal government begin to
assert consumptive use claims in non-navigable waters. In the
1890's, the federal government changed its public domain policy
from disposal with selective retention to widescale retention. The
consequences for state water rights of this shift in public domain
policy was not immediately appreciated by the states, because it
was not immediately reflected in water law doctrines. The Supreme
Court, however, hinted as early as 1899 that there was no blanket
severance in U.S. v. Rio Grande Irrigation Company.31 In that case,
the federal government sued to enjoin the construction of a dam on
a non-navigable reach of the subsequently navigable Rio Grande
River in New Mexico. The Supreme Court held that the United
States had the power to protect the navigable capacity of rivers by
prohibiting upstream impoundments which threatened downstream
navigability. This holding was a significant, but not unexpected, extension of federal commerce power jurisdiction which had been
steadily expanded inland from tidal waters. What was more significant for the Far West was the Court's suggestion that the Property
Clause was an alternative ground for the federal government's
29. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142
(1935). Mr. Justice Sutherland, born in England but raised in Utah, wrote the opinion
in California Oregon Power. He bolstered his argument that by 1877 Congress had
severed western waters from the public domain with the ambiguous suggestion that
the federal government had a duty to dispose of the public domain. This theory
reflected his deep belief that state-created water rights were essential to the future
development of the West. Sutherland was deeply impressed by the agricultural society
Brigham Young had created in Utah by his decision to distribute water widely. Before
Sutherland left for Washington as a first term Congressman, he gave an interview to
the Utah press setting forth his view on the proper policy with respect to the public
domain. As his biographer summarizes the interview: "There was first of all, the question of the disposition of the arid lands held by the national government. Sutherland
was for succession to the states. If this could not be accomplished, he wanted direct
J. PASCAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN
federal aid in building reservoirs.
AGAINST THE STATE 41(1951).
30. Grow & Stewart, supra note 23.
31. 174 U.S. 690, 702 (1899).
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power. Nevertheless, the federal power to allocate western waters
to federal claimants under the property power was not clearly announced by the Supreme Court until United States v. Winters32 in
1908.
Federal reserved water rights were first recognized to benefit
Indian tribes confined to reservations. Non-Indians claims were not
confirmed until 1963. The sequence of recognition has made accommodation even more difficult because Indian claims are an arguably
special and limited case of federal government trusteeship duties
and treaty obligations and thus rest on grounds apart from ownership of the public domain. The broad impact of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Winters was thus not immediately appreciated with the
result that the limitation on title claims of the states grew stronger.
In U.S. v. Winters, the Supreme Court held that the federal
government had the power to reserve water for the benefit of an
Indian tribe confined to a reservation by treaty. The issue was
whether an Indian reservation created by an 1888 treaty could claim
water rights which prevail over actual diversions perfected under
Montana law prior to the time the Indians, through the United
States, claimed the right to divert the stream. The state appropriators argued that no rights could be reserved to the Indians
because federal rights would be inconsistent with Montana's entry
into the Union on an equal footing with the eastern states where the
federal government held little land. The Court brushed aside the
equal footing argument and merged the question of the power to
reserve into the question of whether there had been an intent to
reserve. Emphasizing that the purpose of the creation of the reservation was to civilize the nomadic people, the Court concluded that
"it would be extreme to believe that within a year [Montana entered
the Union in 1899] Congress destroyed the reservation and took
from the Indians the consideration of their grant, leaving them a
barren waste . . .
Given the history of United States Indian policy, 3' it was not surprising that the states did not immediately appreciate the broader
significance of Winters, although the assertion of a federal interest
in the public domain continued in related areas. For example, between 1928 and 1935, the Court held that federal rather than state
law governed title disputes between the states and the federal
32. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
33. Id. at 577.
34. The Winters decision implemented the policy of the General Allotment Act
of 1887, Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. 388 (codified in scattered sections of
25 U.S.C.), to civilize the Indians by acculturating them "in the white tradition, individualism was to supplant communal ways and farming was to be substitute for
hunting." Chambers & Rice, Regulating Sovereignty: Secretarial Discretion and the
Leasing of Indian Lands, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1061, 1071 (1974).
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government. Still the states and their respective patentees seemed
secure in their belief of state "ownership," for the severance theory
received Supreme Court approval in 1935 in the unanimous opinion
by Utah-bred Mr. Justice Sutherland.3 ' The full force of the
severance theory announced in California Oregon Power Co. v.
Portland Beaver Cement Co. 7 lived for twenty years, and reserved
rights were thought to be confined to Indian reservations until 1955
when the Court decided FPC v. Oregon." The issue in FPC v.
Oregon was whether the Federal Power Commission could assert
regulatory jurisdiction over a dam on a non-navigable river running
through withdrawn land and an Indian reservation. Oregon tried to
prevent construction of the dam to protect salmon runs on the
ground that the state "owned" the water. The Court, however, held
that the FPC had jurisdiction, in part, on the ground that the states
did not "own" the water because the three acts said to constitute a
severance did not apply to withdrawn lands. No federal property
claims were involved, and some commentators have therefore tried
to explain the holding as nothing more than an "allocation of power"
case. 9 The clear implication of the opinion was, however, that there
was no blanket severance, the government owned something, and
reserved rights therefore extended to non-Indian lands. This reading
was confirmed in Arizona v. California40 With negligible analysis,
the Court adopted the special Master's recommendation and extended
Winters to non-Indian public lands.
Two important United States Supreme Court cases in 197141 and
one in 197641 interpreted the McCarren Amendment 4 3 holding that
federal agency and Indian rights may be adjudicated in state court
35.
Utah, 283
36.
(1935).
37.
38.
39.
CALIF.

L.

See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); United States v.
U.S. 64 (1931); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935).
California Oregon Power Co. v. Portland Beaver Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142
Id
349 U.S. 535 (1955).
Sato, Water Resources-Comments Upon the Federal-State Relationship, 48
REV.

43 (1960).

40. 373 U.S. 546, 599-601 %1963).
41. United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971);
United States v. District Court for Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971).
42. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976). The holding that the federal government's trusteeship duties are not impaired
by state court adjudication of Indian rights because all substantive questions are
reviewable upon appeal to the Supreme Court is criticized in Abrams, Reserved Water
Rights, Indian Rights and the Narrowing Scope of Federal Jurisdiction. The "Colorado River" Decision, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1978).
43. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976).
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proceedings provided the state has a general adjudication statute,
but confirmed the federal government's power to reserve water
without further amplifying the basis of the doctrine. Finally, in 1976,
the Court attempted a synthesis of the doctrine which treated the
existence of federal reserved rights on non-Indian lands as beyond
dispute. In Cappaert v. United States," Mr. Chief Justice Burger explained the doctrine as follows:
This Court has long held that when the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain and
reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated
to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation. In so doing the United States acquires a reserved
right in unappropriated water which vests on the date of the
reservation and is superior to the rights of future appropriators. Reservation of water rights is empowered by
the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, which permits federal
regulation of navigable streams, and the Property Clause,
Art. IV, § 3, which permits federal regulation of federal
lands. The doctrine applies to Indian reservations and other
federal enclaves, encompassing water rights in navigable and
5
non-navigable streams.'
Despite the certainty of Cappaert, the Court has never satisfactorily justified the application of the doctrine to non-Indian lands,
and it has left two important technical problems unanswered. First,
the Court has never clearly explained how reserved rights can be
squared with the severeance theory announced in California Oregon
Power." Second, no opinion has ever explained why a reserved right
has a priority date as of the date of the withdrawal. Arguably, the
federal government's latent "riparian" rights could date from the
time that the federal government acquired the land, which is to say
that they are automatically superior to any state created rights.
Indian water rights can be justified on the Court's recognition of
the federal government's special duties toward the Indians, but
Winters does not automatically support the extension to withdrawn
public lands. A better explanation of non-Indian reserved rights is
that they stem from the federal government's trusteeship over the
public lands. In Light v. United States,7 the Supreme Court upheld
44.
45.
46.
47.

426
426
295
220

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

128 (1976).
at 138.
142 (1935).
523 (1911).
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the power of Congress to withdraw "large bodies of land from settlement" reasoning that "[a]ll the public lands of the nation are held
in trust for the people of the whole country . . . and it is not for the
courts to say how that trust shall be administered. That is for Congress to determine.' 8 If Congress' power to reserve the public domain is discretionary, on what basis can a court recognize reserved
rights by implication? The answer must be that resort to congressional intent is a fiction, for what the Court has been doing is formulating its own trust standards. The underlying rationale of the nonIndian reserved rights cases seems to be two unstated assumptions.
The first is that when Congress withdraws public land, it is
reasonable to assume that Congress intended to exercise the full extent of its trust powers. Thus, if water is necessary to help maximize the purpose of the withdrawal, federal water rights will be implied even though Congress itself could have reserved sufficient appurtenant water when it made the withdrawal. The second, and
equally crucial, assumption is that if the Court has misread Congress' intention, Congress can always abandon the reserved right and
reliquish the water to the state.
Once this justification of the application of the doctrine to nonIndian lands is accepted, the two technical problems become easier.
The trust theory helps explain the reasoning in FPC v. Oregon
which limited the severance to lands open to entry as opposed to
withdrawn lands. The justification for the priority date of a reserved
right is harder but still possible once the federal common law basis
of the doctrine is understood. The best explanation is that the doctrine that the right supercedes state-created rights subsequent to
the date of the withdrawal is a sensible balancing of state and
federal interests. The doctrine is not compelled by the Constitution
but is an appropriate exercise of judicial restraint. State water
rights were acquired on the belief that no federal interests would
ever be asserted. To ease the shock of judicially created federal
water rights, a withdrawal is treated as a federal appropriation. The
withdrawal date, therefore, provides a crude form of notice, far
short of that provided subsequent appropriators under state law,
that future federal rights may arise. The doctrine is not the fairest
in the world, but it is a creative judicial solution to a difficult
problem.
B. The Potential Impact of Non-Indian Reserved Rights
Doctrine on the States
For almost two decades, the threat of the belated recognition of
large reserved rights has been a ghost in the state water law
systems, but now the likelihood of substantial federal claims is imminent as federal agencies become more aggressive in their assertion
48.

1& at 537.
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of their rights. The question, of course, is how shall they be integrated into state law systems, as federal law is supreme. The extent to which reserved rights will be integrated into state law
depends largely on Congress, but courts can speak to the question of
integration indirectly by answering questions such as the scope of
the right and the conditions under which it can be exercised.
Federal reserved rights are theoretically troublesome to
western water right holders and planners for two reasons. First,
they are inchoate and thus may pre-empt state-created rights, and
second, the right extends to uses which are potentially broader than
those recognized under state law. Reserved rights are inchoate
because there is no requirement that federal agencies disclose the
claims until the agency chooses to exercise the claim. The right can
be exercised long after the date of the reservation but the priority
date relates back to the date of withdrawal of the land carrying the
appurtenant right. 9 Only state created rights prior to the date of
the withdrawal are vested." Thus, there is no procedure by which
state agencies can accurately gauge the extent of federal claims
short of a general adjudication. As the New Mexico decision illustrates, the Supreme Court has construed the McCarren Act to
allow the states to join the federal government in general adjudication proceedings and thus force some disclosure of reserve rights.
Problems still exist, however. These problems are aggravated
because the federal government is not bound by state definitions of
a perfected appropriation or a beneficial use, since the right is, with
minor exceptions, a federal one.
State hostility is ultimately based on the quantity of water
rights that the federal government might claim. It is hard to judge
the validity of this apprehension. The quantities now claimed by the
Indians are potentially greater than those which may be claimed for
non-Indian uses, but because Indian rights must be quantified and
can probably be sold for non-Indian uses off the reservation such
rights can be integrated into state systems."' Integration is harder
for non-Indian reserved rights because the major claims will be for

49. This characteristic of the reserved right makes it similar to a riparian right
which can be "called" by the riparian as the need for the water arises. Matter of Long
Valley Creek System, 84 Cal. App. 3d 140, 148 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1978) illustrates the
force of the right to future use. The court held that a riparian has a right to have his
"prospective, albeit unexercised use, recognized." At issue was California's 1928 constitutional amendment, article 10, section 2, prohibiting waste and unreasonable
methods of use. The amendment was construed to' recognize the right to future uses
and consistent with this analysis a statute requiring quantification was held unconstitutional.
50. Hunter v. United States, 388 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1967).
51. See E. CLYDE, INDIAN WATER RIGHTS. 2 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS § 143
(Supp. 1978).
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non-consumptive uses such as the preservation of instream flows.
Such claims are often seen as inconsistent with state allocation
priorities which encourage traditional consumptive uses.
Originally, state hostility to the preservation of stream flows
was based on the argument that the recognition of these uses conflicted with state policies which are aimed at preventing the
monopolization of water rights.52 Nevertheless, states are now
recognizing instream uses and their "standing" to object to federal
recognition is diminishing somewhat, although significant differences exist among the states over the procedures for and the extent of preservation flow protection.
Western water law has historically depended upon an out-ofstream application to a beneficial use since this policy furthered the
mission of regional settlement and development. The idea that
water left in a stream could be "used" was simply antithetical to
making the desert bloom, and leaving water in place was a ghost of
the discredited doctrine of riparian rights.53 There has always been a
dissenting minority to this view,5 ' but until recently it was assumed
that water could not be appropriated for instream uses. The
technical reason was that an instream use lacked an actual diversion
and was not beneficial.-" In addition to the judicially imposed requirement of reduction to possession, it has been argued in
Colorado," Idaho 57 and Nebraska' that constitutional guarantees of a
52. The foundation case expressing this fear is Schodde v. Twin Falls Water
Co., 224 U.S. 107 (1912). The argument, based on State Conservation Board v. Enking,
56 Idaho 722, 58 P.2d 779 (1936), was made and rejected in Idaho's instream flow approporiation case, State Department of Parks v. Idaho Department of Water Administration, 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974).
53. See Tarlock, Appropriation for Instream Flow Maintenance: A Progress
Report on "New" Public Western Water Rights, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 211; Recent
Developments in the Recognition of Instream Uses in Western Water Law, 1975
UTAH L. REV. 871.

54.

Empire Water Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).

55. E.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power
Co., 158 Colo. 331, 406 P.2d 798 (1965). The case is criticized in Ellis, Water CoursesRecreation Uses for Water Under PriorAppropriationLaw, 6 NAT. RESOURCES J. 180
(1966). See also Comment, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 170 (1973). The California State Water
Resources Control Board has rejected an application by the Department of Fish and
Game for in stream appropriation on the ground that the Department failed to show
that they would have dominion and control over the water, and a court of appeals has
held that the rejection was proper because the applicant lacked physical control over
the water. Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control Board, - Cal.App. 3d __
,
153 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1979). Accord, California Trout, Inc. v. California State Water
Resources Control Board, Cal. App. 3d. __
, 153 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1979).
56. COLO. CONST. art. 16, § 6. The Colorado Supreme Court has held that this
section does not prohibit instream flow appropriations Colorado River Conservation
Dist. v. Colorado Water Conservation Board, Colo. 594 P.2d 570 (1979).

57.

IDAHO CONST.

58.

NEB. CONST. art 15, §6.

art. 15, §3.
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perpetual right to divert prohibited the recognition of instream
uses. Most states now recognize that the state's police power gives
them the authority to withdraw certain waters from appropriation,
reserve minimum flows for instream uses and deny appropriations
to reserve water for higher uses.59
Legislatures in Colorado, 0 Idaho6 and Montana"2 have created
procedures for state appropriation or reservation of 'rights for
preservation flows. In upholding the right of the state to file appropriations on legislatively designated streams, the leading Idaho
case of State Department of Parks v. Idaho Department of Water
Administration" holds that the legislature may eliminate the actual
diversion requirement, that instream uses are presumptively
beneficial, and that the constitutional guarantee of the right to appropriate does not prevent the state from deciding what water will
be open to public and private appropriators. In 1978, Idaho passed
legislation which allows the Water Resource Board to file for
minimum stream flow appropriations on all of the state's waters."
The recognition of instream uses is not consistent, however,
throughout the West, and the amount of water which should be
withdrawn remains bitterly
controversial as the Yellowstone reser65
vation hearings illustrate.
IV.

THE OPINION IN UNITED STATES V. NEW MEXICO
A. The Issues and their Significance

United States v. New Mexico raises three important issues:
(1) does the Creative Act of 1891 or the Organic Administration Act
of 1897 include reserved rights for instream flows; (2) does other

59. "In 1978, Idaho amended its water code to allow the Director of the Department of Water Resources to deny an application for an appropriation application on
three grounds including "that it will conflict with the local public interest, where local
public interest is defined as the affairs of the people in the area directly affected by
the proposed use." IDAHO CODE § 42- 203 (Supp. 1978). These three grounds are in addition to the grounds of unavailability and interference with prior rights. The constitutionality of this section is discussed in Grant, The Idaho Water Pla. Two Threshold
ConstitutionalProblems and Suggested Solutions, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 443 (1979).
60. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37- 92- 102(3) (1973).
61. IDAHO CODE § 64-4307 (Supp. 1979).
62. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 89-8-103 to -105 (1977).
63. 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974). Reed, Should Rivers Have Running?
Toward the Extension of the Reserved Rights Doctrine to Include Minimum Stream
Flows, 12 IDAHO L. REV. 153 (1975); See Comment, Instream Appropriationfor Recreation and Scenic Beauty, 12 IDAHO L. REV. 263 (1975).
64. IDAHO CODE §§ 42-1501 to 1505 (Supp. 1978). IDAHO CODE § 42-1503 contains
strict standards of necessity and provides for legislative vetos of any approved appropriation.
65. See Tarlock, AppropriationFor Instream Flow Preservation,supra note 53,
at 241-42.
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conservation era withdrawal legislation, such as the National Park
Service Act of 1916, form a sufficient basis for claiming reserved
rights, and (3) can federal permittees claim reserved rights by virtue
of a federal permit? This last issue is important not only for stock
grazing permittees, but also for energy development where oil, oil
shale and geothermal leases might be a basis for a reserved right.
The Court's opinion addressed all three issues, although only the
first and third were raised by the case.
The narrow issue before the Court was whether the withdrawal
of land for the Gila National Forest carried with it reserved rights
for recreation, aesthetics, wildlife preservation and stock watering.
As Mr. Justice Rehnquist stated, the resolution of the issue "isa
question of implied intent, and not power."6 United States v. New
Mexico is the most difficult intent case to come before the court.
The Indian cases, starting with Winters, can be seen as a belated
recognition of the special obligations owing to the Indians under the
trust. Arizona v. California7 and Cappaert v. United States" dealt
with small amounts of water for water related reservations such as
wildlife refuges and national monuments or where it was justifiable
to conclude that Congress had decided that the purpose of the reservation would have been impaired, if not frustrated, by the nonrecognition of federal reserved rights. United States v. New Mexico,
in contrast, involved a frank effort by the federal government to expand the reserved rights doctrine in order to take account of the
ever-evolving mission of a federal land management agency. The
relationship between implied intent and the agency's mission was
much less clear than it was in previous cases. The case thus required the Court to articulate clearly for the first time, the policies
and standards for determining implied intent to withdraw and to
confront the implications of the fact that the reserved rights doctrine is federal common law.
B. Facts and Lower Court Holdings
The facts were relatively simple, as water users in New Mexico
were not particularly interested in the claims of the United States
in this case. The users and the state were looking to other adjudications where the conflict between federal reserved right claims and
subsequent state appropriations was much greater. The Court obliged
western water users by taking the opportunity to restate and revise
the law of non-Indian federal reserved rights in order to blunt its
impact.
The Rio Mimbres River arises in southwestern New Mexico in
the upper reaches of the Gila National Forest. The river, which is
66.
67.
68.

U.S. at 98 S. Ct. at 3013.
373 U.S. 546 (1963).
426 U.S. 128 (1976).
-
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fully appropriated, flows through "more than 50 miles" of privately
owned lands before it disappears into a desert sink north of the
Mexican border. In 1966, the Mimbres Valley Irrigation District
began a private adjudication, and in 1970 the state of New Mexico
intervened seeking a general adjudication of rights on the river and
its tributaries. Because New Mexico has a general adjudication
statute, it was able to join the United States as a defendant due to
the Supreme Court's construction of the McCarren Act in United
States v. District Court for Eagle County." A special state master
found that the United States was diverting 6.5 acre feet for domestic
and residential use and .1 acre feet for wildlife purposes. He further
found that specified amounts of water were being used in the Gila
National Forest for stock watering and that an instream flow of six
cubic feet per second was being "used" for the purposes of fish
preservation. The special master held that all these government
uses fell within the scope of the reserved rights doctrine, but a New
Mexico district court and the State Supreme Court refused
to accept the recommendation holding that the United States could
not, at least before the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960,0
claim reserved rights for either instream flows or stock-watering
purposes.71
C. The Arguments
The federal government based its claim that Congress had impliedly reserved water for all the claimed uses on three acts. The
first, The Creative Act of 1891, authorized Presidential withdrawals
of forest reserves. The second, the Organic Administration Act of
1897, was enacted as a response, in part, to the anguished pleas of
westerners who claimed that Washington was making them a colony
by withdrawing the public domain from productive use by defining
with great care the purposes for which land could be withdrawn.
The third, the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, codified
long-standing administrative practices and authorized forest
management for a wide range of purposes. The United States' argument was that the two early acts were intended for purposes compatible with the reservation of water for instream flows and that
the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act was only a legislative confirmation of the broad purposes for which forests were originally
withdrawn. The United States wisely did not argue that the 1960
Act created new reserved rights with a retroactive priority date.

69. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
70. 16 U.S.C. §f 528 et seq. (1976).
U.S. _
, 98 S.Ct. 2985 (1978); Mimbres
71. United States v. New Mexico, Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 90 N.M. 410, 564 P.2d 615 (1977). See Note, New Mexico's National Forests and the Implied Reservation Doctrine, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J.
975 (1976).
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The Holding and Reasoning

The Court in US. v. New Mexico held that the 1891 and 1897
Acts evidence an intent to limit the reservation of water rights "only
where necessary to preserve the timber or to secure favorable
water flows for private uses under state law." 2 This is, as we will
argue, an incomplete reading of the legislative history of the acts.
The majority's narrow reading of the statute flows from the explicit premise of the opinion: reserved rights must be limited in the
west to protect the interests of existing and future appropriators.
Apparently the majority opinion rests on a deep-seated hostility to
reserved rights. How else could Mr. Justice Rehnquist conclude that
the Forest Service's argument "that Congress intended to reserve
water for recreation and wild-life preservation is not only inconsistent with Congress' failure to recognize these goals as purposes of
the national forests, but would defeat the very purposes for which
Congress did create the national forest system-to protect
downstream flows needed for irrigation."73
Mr. Justice Rehnquist's hostility is illustrated by his resolution
of an issue not before the Court. The federal government claimed no
rights under the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960.
Nonetheless, the Court decided to try and foreclose any such claims
by developing out of whole cloth the unclear theory that even if the
1960 Act which expanded the statutory purposes for which forests
could be managed and could logically serve as a basis for an implied
reservation, were to be applied the expanded purposes are secondary to the primary purposes of the 1891 and 1897 legislation. From
this premise, it was said to follow that Congress did not intend to
reserve water for secondary uses with a 1960 priority under the
Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act. Unless one accepts the theory
that the 1960 legislation created reserved rights with an 1897 or
1891 priority, a 1960 or later priority date would have done the
government no good, and seldom will, as all state appropriations
have priority dates long antedating 1960. Since, as Mr. Justice
Powell noted, there was no reason to reach this issue, the proffered
construction of the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield issue is dicta.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, like his earlier western predecessor, Mr.
Justice Sutherland, has decided to draw on his experience with
western water law disputes to develop a law of federal water rights
protective of state interests. Reserved rights are now said to be "a
doctrine built on implication and an exception to Congress's explicit
deference to state water law in other areas."7 The late assertion of
72.
73.
74.

__

, 98 S.Ct. at 3023.
98 S.Ct. at 3020.
.
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federal reserved rights clearly places a cloud on the title of all
western water rights, and only the most blind adherents to the
theory that the federal government's wisdom to make superior
resource allocations follows from the Supremacy Clause would deny
the need to accommodate federal and state interests by limiting the
claims of the federal government. This accommodation, however, can
best be accomplished by political processes. There is a need to require the systematic disclosure of federal claims to provide an inventory of claims and to provide strict standards for the exercise of
reserved rights."5 After this is done, it would be an appropriate time
for Congress to decide when federal rights should give way to state
rights or to consider compensation mechanisms where the federal interest in allocating the water is paramount. Our basic objection to
the majority's opinion is that it deprives the federal government of
the discretion to work out an administrative and political accommodation in a situation where the result is not clearly dictated by the
legislative history of the acts construed.
In order to limit the federal government's power to claim
reserved rights, Mr. Justice Rehnquist first announced a frustration
of purpose standard"6 for determining whether Congress impliedly
intended to withdraw appurtenant rights.
[Tihe Court has repeatedly emphasized that Congress
reserved "only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the
purpose of the reservation, no more." . . . Each time this
Court has applied the "implied-reservation-of water
doctrine," it has carefully examined both the asserted water
right and the specific purposes for which the land was
reserved, and concluded that without the water the purposes
of the reservation would be entirely defeated.
This careful examination is required both because the
reservation is implied, rather than expressed, and because of
the history of congressional intent in the field of federalstate jurisdiction with respect to allocation of water. Where

75. See Trelease, Water Resources on Public Lands: P.L.L.R.C's Solution to
the Reservation Doctrine, 6 LAND WATER L. REV. 89 (1970). WATER POLICIES FOR THE
FUTURE, FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE

NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION (1973); Note, A Proposalfor the Quantification of Indian Water Rights, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1299 (1974); Note, Water in the Woods: The
Reserved-Rights Doctrine and National Forest Lands, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1968).

See also Kiechel Burke, Federal-StateRelations in Water Resources Adjudication: Integration of Reserve Rights With appropriative Rights, 18 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST.
531 (1972).
76. __
U.S. __
, 98 S.Ct. at 3015. Professor (now Dean) Meyers has analyzed Winters as a frustration of purposes case. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L.
REV. 169 (1966). See also Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How It Grew: Federal
Reservation of Rights to the Use of Water, 3 B.Y.U.L. REV. 639 (1975).
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Congress has expressly addressed the question of whether
federal entities must abide by state water law, it has almost
invariably deferred to the state law. . . Where water is
necessary to fulfill the very purposes for which a federal
reservation was created, it is reasonable to conclude, even in
the face of Congress' express deference to state water law in
other areas, that the United States intended to reserve the
necessary water. Where water is only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation, however, there arises the contrary inference that Congress intended, consistent with its
other views, that the United States would acquire water in
the same manner as any other private or public appropriator.77
Mr. Justice Rehnquist's analysis rests on three Supreme court
8
cases-Winters v. United States,"
Arizona v. California," and
0
Cappaert v. United States -each of which contains some support
for his position. A close reading of the cases, however, suggests that
the Court has never viewed frustration of purpose as the sole basis
for implying intent to reserve.
As previously discussed, the issue in Winters was whether the
government intended to reserve water for the Fort Bellknapp reservation, which was carved out of a larger tract of arid lands which
the Indians had an established right to use. The smaller tract
without irrigation would have been inadequate to allow the Indians
to survive and prosper. In answer to an argument that the Indians
deliberately gave up whatever rights they might have had, the
Court in Winters said: "Did they give up all of this? Did they reduce
the area of their occupation and give up the waters which made it
valuable or adequate . . .By a rule of interpretation of agreement
and treaties with the Indians, ambiguities occurring will be resolved
from the standpoint of the Indians."81 The Court, by addressing the
problem of the United States' trust responsibility to the Indians, did
no more than articulate the government's duty of fair dealing. It did
not state a general theory of frustration of purpose.
The Court in Arizona v. California held that the special master's
award of reserved rights to an Indian reservation, a national recreational area, two wildlife refuges, and a national forest was proper.
On the issue of reserved rights, Mr. Justice Black first rejected
Arizona's argument that the United States did not intend to reserve
water for the Indians by reaffirming the theory underlying Winters
77.

__

78.
79.
80.
81.

207
373
426
207
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U.S.
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546 (1963).
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that there is a presumption of reservation because of the government's duty of fair dealing with the Indians. Second, the special
master's extension of the doctrine to non-Indian withdrawn lands
was accepted without analysis.2 Therefore, Arizona v. California
stands only for the proposition that the federal government can
claim reserved rights for non-Indian lands. The opinion does not
speak to the standard of implied intent.
Cappaert involved the Devil's Hole pup fish's habitat, which according to the proclamation withdrawing the Death Valley National
Monument, "evolved from the original ancestral stock that in
Pleistocene times was common to the entire region" and lives in a
pool which "is a unique subsurface remnant of the prehistoric chain
of lakes which in Pleistocene times formed the Death Valley Lake
System.18 3 The pool was interconnected to a source of groundwater,
and Nevada appropriators were causing a drawdown. Claiming
reserved rights, the United States sued to enjoin pumping in order
to protect the level of the pool. Mr. Chief Justice Burger, writing for
a unanimous Court, made only two statements with respect to the
standard of intent. He first summarized the prior cases: "This Court
has long held that when the federal government withdraws its land
from the public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the
government by implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the
reservation."'" His second statement, almost a restatement of the
first, was that "intent is inferred if the previously unappropriated
waters are necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the
reservation was created.18 5 Cappaert did not, however, apply these
doctrines, because on the issue of intent, the court concluded that
since the Reservation Proclamation mentioned the Devil's Hole pool
in four of the five preambles, "the water right this reserved by the
1952 Proclamation was thus explicit, not implied."'"
This analysis of the three precedents relied upon by the Court
suggests that the majority formulation of implied intent was not
compelled by prior cases, as the Court seems to have recognized. In
an effort to bolster his standard of implied intent, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist next asserted that the reserved rights doctrine is "an exception to Congress' explicit deference to state water law in other
areas" 87 and thus his standard followed accordingly. United States v.
New Mexico was decided the same day as California v. United
82.
83.
84.

373 U.S. at 599-601.
Pres. Proc. No. 2961, 3 CFR 147 (1949- 53 Comp.).
426 U.S. at 138.

85. Id.
86. Id at 139.
87.
- U.S. at

-

,

98 S.Ct. at 3014.

IDAHO LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 15

States88 which applied this principle to allow states a partial veto
over federal operation of Reclamation Projects. There is a critical
distinction between the two cases. Mr. Justice Rehnquist missed it,
but Mr. Justice Powell-the only Justice to vote to uphold state
claims in the California case but not in New Mexico-did not. Mr.
Justice Powell's decision to switch sides in the above mentioned
cases illuminates the weakness of the foundation of the majority's
frustration of purpose standard. The distinction between the two
cases is this: California v. United States construed a federal statute
containing an express deference to state water law; United States v.
New Mexico involved at best an implied deference, and less
deference is due the states because the federal interest at stake involves the management of public lands and is stronger than the
federal interest in reclamation spending which was the basis of the
issue in California v. United States. Thus, there was no need to
characterize the reserved rights doctrine as "an exception to Congress' explicit deference to state water law in other areas" as the
Court did.
California v. United States clarifies the long-standing debate
over the meaning of section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, which
provides "the Secretary of the Interior . . . shall proceed in conformity with . . ." state law "relating to the control, appropriation, use,
or distribution of water used in irrigation."" The Reclamation Act
of 1902 authorizes the construction of federal projects for state
beneficiaries, but the federal government often asserts an interest
in the allocation of project waters because it furnishes the initial
funds and picks up the non-reimbursable costs. Still, despite
arguments to the contrary," the primary purpose of a Reclamation
Project is to direct federal subsidies to state beneficiaries. For this
reason, it has been assumed that section 8 requires the federal
government to defer the state law of water allocation by acquiring
rights through state procedures and distributing the waters in a
manner consistent with state law. As Mr. Justice Douglas explained
in Nebraska v. Wyoming:91 "Appropriation was made not for the use
of the government, but, under the Reclamation Act, for the use of
the land owners; and by the terms of the law and of the contract
already referred to, the water-rights became the property of the
land owners, wholly distinct from the property right of the government in the irrigation works.

88.
89.

U.S. -,
98 S.Ct. 2985 (1978).
43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976).
-

90. See Sax, FederalReclamation Law, 2 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS (R. Clark
ed. 1967).
91. 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
92. Id at 614 (quoting Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 94-95 (1937)).
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Because the power to spend carries with it the power to condition the use of federal funds, the presumption that the federal
government is a mere financier and carrier for state beneficiaries
must give way when the federal government asserts an overriding
interest in the reclamation project. The presumption was properly
overcome in Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken,93 where the
Court held that the state of California could not prevent the United
States from acquiring water rights for a project and distributing it
according to a federal mandate inconsistent with state law. At issue
was section 5 of the Reclamation Act which prohibits the delivery of
water to tracts in excess of 160 acres owned by a single individual.9
If the federal government has the power to construct a reclamation
project, it can condition access to subsidies to further important
federal interests-in Ivanhoe, the deconcentration of agricultural
land holdings. Few, if any, would quarrel with the holding in
Ivanhoe, but the Court went on to suggest in dictum that section 8
meant only that state law controls the definition of vested rights
when the federal government acquires project water rights. This
reading, of course, strips state law of any role in the allocation of
project waters and makes the unwarranted assumption that the application of state law will always frustrate an important interest.
The dictum was repeated in two more cases95 before the Court decided
California v. United States. This last case was a good one in which
to re-examine the above mentioned dicta, because the state of
California was asserting the- right to condition the use of water for a
project where there was no clear overriding federal interest. The irrigation district which would have been the contractee had not been
organized, and the state was asserting only the right to condition
the use of the water in the interim for environmental purposes, a
policy which at least-after the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969-is not per se inconsistent with federal policy.
When, however, the federal government claims water rights as a
landowner, the United States has a greater interest in the water
than when it claims rights as a carrier; it asserts the right to control
the distribution of Reclamation Project waters in the absence of an
express congressional declaration of federal policy. As Mr. Justice
Powell noted in his dissent in New Mexico, the recognition of the
federal government's greater interest does not dispense with the
need to apply the reserved rights doctrine "with sensitivity to its
impact upon those who have obtained water rights under state law
and to Congress' general policy of deference to state water law.""
93. 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
94. 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1976).
95. City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963); Arizona v. California, 373,
U.S. 546 (1963).
96. U.S. at
, 98 S.Ct. at 3023.
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The greater federal interest, however, permits the Court to fashion
a common law of reserved rights without explicit textual authority.
The Court's general philosophy of reserved rights formed the
background for the holding that neither the Creative Act of 1891
nor the Organic Administration Act of 1897 could be read to support
federal reserved rights for instream uses, recreation, or stockwatering. Mr. Justice Rehnquist relied primarily on the Organic Administration Act of 1897 which he gives a tight grammatical reading
supplemented by an incomplete historical theory of its purpose.
Both the grammar and history arguments are weak.
The 1897 Act provides: "No national forest shall be established,
except to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or
for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and
to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities
of citizens of the United States; but it is not the purpose or intent of
these provisions, or of [the Creative Act of 1891], to authorize the inclusion therein of lands more valuable for the mineral therein, or for
agricultural purposes, than for forest purposes."97 The Forest Service argued that the Act envisioned three purposes for the forests
and that instream rights fell within the first purpose, "to improve
and protect the forest. . .", but the Court found only two purposes.
To support his conclusion that Congress limited the forest reserves
to only two purposes, Mr. Justice Rehnquist adopted the following
definition of the word "or", "a coordinating conjunction introducing
an alternative."9 He found this reading of the Act justified because
it was "inconceivable that a Congress which was primarily concerned
with limiting the President's power to reserve the forest lands of
the West, would provide for the creation of forests merely to 'improve and protect."'" His theory adopts the common assumption
that the broad authority of the 1891 Act aroused bitter western opposition to the reserves, and that Congress responded to this opposition by sharply curtailing the executive discretion delegated in 1891
by passing an act which was "a charter for forest management and
economic uses within the forests."' 00 Our reading of the history of
the 1891 and 1897 Acts suggests that Mr. Justice Rehnquist has
misunderstood the purposes of the Acts and the relationship between the two, and lends support to the brief dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Powell and suggests a rationale for the recognition of
reserved rights for instream flows in the national forests created
under the 1891 and 1897 Acts.

97.
98.

16 U.S.C. § 475 (1976).
n.14, 98 S.Ct. at
- U.S. at -

99.
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S.Ct. at 3017.
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Mr. Justice Powell, writing for himself and Mr. Justices Brennan,
White and Marshall, adopted the "natural reading" of the 1897 Act
which attributes three, not two, purposes to the legislation. The
reservation of instream flows falls within the first purpose because
"the forests consist of the birds, animals, and fish-the
wildlife-that inhabit them, as well as the trees, flowers, shrubs,
and grasses. I therefore would hold that the United States is entitled
to so much water as is necessary to sustain the wildlife of the
forests, as well as the plants." 1 ' This view adopts the position urged
by the National Wildlife Federation in an amicus brief that at common
law the term "forest" included flora and fauna. The conclusion has
support in the legislative history but not in the National Wildlife
Federation position. 2
V.

AN ALTERNATIVE READING OF THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. The Alternative Reading Summarized
This section presents an alternative reading of the background
and legislative history of the 1891, 1897 and other relevant acts
which would have permitted the Court to reach the opposite conclusion. The Court's construction of the Creative Act of 1891 and
Organic Administration Act of 1897 is based on the assumption that
the Acts were passed for only two limited purposes, and thus Congress did not intend to reserve minimum instream flows for fish and
wildlife uses. To reach this conclusion, Mr. Justice Rehnquist drew a
distinction between subsequent congressional legislation creating
the two forest reserve acts, the National Park Service,'0 3 and fish
and wildlife sanctuaries within national forests,' 4 and the express
recognition of instream values in the creation of a particular
forest."5 He concluded that only in this limited second class of
withdrawals was it arguable that Congress intended to reserve

101. 1& at , 98 S.Ct. at 3023.
102. Both the National Wildlife Federation amicus brief and the dissenting opinion rely upon Lund, Early American Wildlife Law, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 703 (1976). The
study suggests, however, that the demands of the frontier were too robust to support
such a static view of the forest as the dominant theme of early american wildlife law
was the encouragement of what we now call sustained yield management.
103. National Park Service Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1976).
104. Act of March 10, 1934, 16 U.S.C. § 694 (1976).
105. 16 U.S.C. § 577b (1976). The Shipstead-Nolan Act established water levels in
the area of Lake Superior National Forest, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist used the Act to
show that when Congress wanted to recognize instream flows "it expressly so
directed, as it did in the case of Lake Superior National Forest." U.S. at -.
98
S.Ct. at 3019. The example is not on point because the Shipstead-Nolan Act sought to
prevent the further alteration of natural water levels in the area which might result
from flooding. There is a difference between this objective and one which seeks to protect a minimum instream flow by leaving the water in place.
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water for instream uses. Underpinning this construction of the
legislation is a reliance on conventional historical wisdom which sees
the 1891 Act as the inception of national forests, a victory for the
scientific conservation movement won at the expense of intense
western opposition. This opposition was said to have forced Congress to accommodate Western interests in 1897 by limiting the purposes for which forests could be withdrawn and opening the
reserves to use and management.
Our reading of the debate over forest policy between 1865 and
1897 and the legislative background of the two Acts, as well as
subsequent ones, suggests that Mr. Justice Rehnquist's construction
of the Act does not comport with their history. The Court relied exclusively on a single and inadequate secondary source for its entire,
and quite limited, analysis of the 1891 legislation.' ° Failure to probe
106. The Court relied almost exclusively upon J. ISE. THE UNITED STATES
FOREST POLICY (1920). Ise wrote with a clear disdain for Congress, which had, according to Ise, "shown an utter incapacity to deal intelligently with the public timber; and
all hope for future conservation must center in the provision which would take some of
the timber out of the hands of Congress-the provision enabling the President to set
aside forest reserves" Id. at 119-20. Ise treated the 1891 bill predominately in the context of timber management and as proof of the incapacity of Congress to deal with
that important issue. Thus biased, Ise was in a poor position to deal with the nontimber aspects of the 1891 and 1897 Acts and was, in addition, an especially questionable source upon which to rely regarding the intent of Congress. Ise, like many
historians of his day and ours, presented the conservative movement as a fight between good and evil with the forces of light gathered in the East and the forces of
darkness, like Milton's fallen angels, in the West. This led him to read the twentieth
century debate on the management of the public lands into the legislative history of
the 1891 Act. Specifically, Ise argued that in 1891 Congress was lulled into passing an
act which allowed the reservation of public land forest reserves. His version has been
unquestioned until recently in its general contours. Basically, Ise argued that
Secretary of the Interior Noble was successful in having section 24, authorizing the
creation of reserves, "tacked on" to the end of the 1891 General Land Law Revision
while the bill was in Conference Committee. Id. at 130. Although such a procedure was
contrary to congressional rules, the final item was barely noticed, and the bill passed
without comment on section 24. The lack of discussion of the reserve concept led Ise to
conclude that Congress did not understand the implications of the concept and would
not have enacted the measure had its true importance been understood. Until the early 1970's virtually every subsequent scholarly account of forest history-and Mr.
Justice Rehnquist- followed Ise. The degree to which Ise has been cited and/or
adopted by major and minor writers in the area can be established by consulting A.
CARHART, TIMBER IN YOUR LIFE 60-61 (1955); M. CLAWSON & B. HELD, THE FEDERAL
LANDS: THEIR USE AND MANAGEMENT 27-28 (1957); S. DANA, FOREST AND RANGE POLICY
100-02 (1956); M. FROME, THE FOREST SERVICE 11 (1971); GATES, supra note 8 at 565; HIBBARD, supra note 8 at 530; E. PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 15 (1951); G.
PINCHOT, BREAKING NEW GROUND 85-86 (1947); R. NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN
MIND 133 (1967); ROBBINS, supra note 8 at 303-07; P. ROBERTS, HOOFPRINTS ON FOREST
RANGES 18-19 (1963); G. ROBINSON. THE FOREST SERVICE 6 (1975); A. ROGERS III, BERNARD EDUARD FERNOW 155 (1951); H. STEEN, THE FOREST SERVICE: A HISTORY 26-27
(1977); S. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS 100-01 (1963).
Two recent doctoral dissertations have done much to correct Ise's errors and
biases. See H. Kirkland, The American Forests, 1864-1898: A Trend Toward Conservation 140-87 (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University); J. Miller,
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beyond that single, albeit much cited source, led it to make erroneous distinctions between forest and park reservations made during the same period. Having failed to understand the 1891 Act and its
implementation, the Court was unable to assess the important but
subtle distinctions between the 1891 and 1897 Acts. It thus failed to
understand the important provisions of the 1897 Act and also failed
to address an equally critical relationship between the 1897 Act and
the Transfer Act. °7 That 1905 legislation sent the forest reserves
from the General Land Office in the Department of the Interior to
the Department of Agriculture, and thus under the wing of Gifford
Pinchot, soon to be first Chief of the Forest Service.108 Pinchot succeeded Bernhard Fernow as head of the Division of Forestry in 1898
and began agitating for the transfer. A principal theme in favor of
the transfer was that forestry was "tree cultivation upon a large
scale covering long periods of time."' 09 This was an entirely different
concept of forestry from that which had dominated congressional
discussions of the previous decades,"' and there was initial
resistance to the idea. Only after much effort from Pinchot and
Roosevelt was it eventually accepted by Congress. Although the
drafters of the Transfer Act explicitly said that there was "no
change whatsoever"''
in the purpose of the reserves, Congress
recognized that the Act harbingered a radical shift in forest policy.
Thus, the 1905 Transfer Act, not the Acts of 1891 and 1897, is the
appropriate beginning of the scientific conservation era in forestry.
Specifically, we argue that the legislative history leading up to the
1891 Creative Act suggests that the primary purpose was to create
Congress and the Origins of Conservation 230-38 (1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Minnesota). Kirkland and Miller have done much of the painstaking
review of the Congressional Record and other relevant documents which are conspicuously absent from virtually all previous sources. See also, B. FERNOW. REPORT
UPON THE FORESTRY INVESTIGATIONS OF THE U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE 1877-1898, H.R.
Doc. No. 181, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess. 190-204 (1899), which is also ignored by most of the
other authors. This oversight is inexplicable given Fernow's central position in all the
events of the 1890's. The only writer who expressed an accurate understanding of the
range of public and congressional concerns leading up to section 24 is Samuel P. Hays.
S. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY (1969). Unfortunately, citing no
references, Hays concludes "The campaign to establish forest reserves had its origin...
in the drive by wilderness groups to perpetuate untouched large areas of natural beauty, by Eastern arborculturists and botonists to save trees for the future, and by
Western water users, both large corporations and small owners, to preserve their
water supply by controlling silting." Id at 263-64.
107. Transfer Act of 1905, 33 Stat. 628 (1905).
108. Pinchot has told the story himself in his autobiography, BREAKING NEW
GROUND, supra note 106 at 161-203. The Forest Service was not founded until 1905, and
the forest reserves were not renamed national forests until 1907.
109. 35 CONG. REC. 6509 (1902) (Statement of Congressman Lacey). See also the
exchange between Representatives Shafroth and Scott, id. at 6572-73.
110. For a detailed discussion of the development of the term "forestry," see H.
SMITH, 12 AGRICULTURAL HISTORY 326 (1935).
111. 35 CONG. REC. at 6515.
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forest reserves, which are better understood in present-day terms
as parks rather than forests; that Congress understood what it was
doing in 1891; and that the pressures which led to the 1897 Act cannot be simply explained as anti-western reaction to the policy of
"locking up" the forests; instead the 1897 Act is a modification but
not a rejection of the purposes of the 1891 legislation. Moreover, the
1905 Act rather than the 1891 and 1897 Acts is the precursor of
scientific forest management as presently understood. The transition from forest reserve to national forest is a phenomena appropriately associated with the Roosevelt-Pinchot era in American
conservation, and has little at all to do with the 1890's statutes
misconstrued by the courts.
We are, therefore, arguing that "protecting the forest" was a
legitimate, in fact the overriding, purpose of the reserves in both
the 1891 and 1897 Acts. It does not, however, automatically follow
that the purposes of the reserves extend to protection of fish and
wildlife. To so argue would make the unwarranted assumption that
Congress understood the modern concept of "ecosystem management." The legislative record provides only scattered references to
congressional recognition that the forest was a system which included
flora and fauna, and these occurred some twenty years before the
passage of the Creative Act.1 ' Our argument is the more modest
claim that once it is understood that Congress and subsequent administrators accepted aesthetic preservation and protection of
wildlife as primary purposes of the reserves, the Court has the
discretion to allow reserved rights related to these objectives. In
short, we are arguing that because the doctrine of reserved rights
has always been based on federal common law a search for specific
congressional intent to reserve is misdirected. The proper standard
is whether the recognition of reserved rights is reasonably related
to enhancement of the purposes of the withdrawal.
B. Background of the 1891 Act
The conventional wisdom about the Creativity Act is that it
was, in former Secretary Udall's words, "a fluke.""' It passed
undebated by a Congress which did not understand its implications,
after it was added by Committee action as the final section of a
lengthy and complex general land law revision." ' The conventional
wisdom is, however, simply not true; Congress had been aware of
timber depletion problems since the early 1800's. Initial programs
protected material needed by the Navy, but after George Perkins
112. During a discussion of the pending Timber Culture Act, one representative
suggested that destroying the trees leads to the disappearance of insectivorous birds,
and "as the birds disappear, fruit-destroying insects increase." CONG. REC. 2898
(1872).
113. Udall, supra note 106, at 101.
114. See supra note 106.
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Marsh's epochal study, Man and Nature,"5 was published in 1864, national concern focused on the long-term, unintended consequences of
human intervention in natural process. Forest destruction became
an early theme in growing cries of alarm.
In the 1870's, the particular national concern with forest
destruction had two basic components. The dominant and most
durable focus of attention was water. As settlers entered the
treeless plains and encountered harsh conditions of the arid West,
the Congressional Record filled with discussions of the relationship
between forest cover and water supply. Trees, it was widely believed,
caused rain; prevented floods; held winter snows, snow melt and
rainwater in the soil; prevented evaporation from rivers, springs
and watersheds; and contributed incalculably to the quantity, distribution and quality of water supplies. " " Forest preservation was,
therefore, essential to the settlement and prosperity of the West
because water was essential. This general principle was at the heart of
every post-Civil War discussion of forest problems, and was not
seriously questioned until the twentieth century debates on the
Weeks Act.""
A secondary focus was on the role of the forests providing
timber for building homes, fences, mine shafts, railroad crossties,
and many other necessities of development and settlement. Even as
the necessity for forest cover was being recognized, the logging industry was moving constantly westward seeking new supplies to
replace the worked-over forests of the northeast, southeast and
midwest, leaving fire, erosion, flood, and siltation in its wake. Fear
of "timber famine" became an important antecedent of the conservation movement."'"The westward movement was surprisingly rapid.
In 1865, New York still provided more timber than any other state.
By 1868, the "Golden Age" of lumbering had arrived in the Great
Lakes area. " 9 The completion of the transcontinental railroad
simultaneously opened the West for full economic development,
hence underscoring the need for water and bringing home the idea
115.

G. MARSH, MAN AND NATURE (1864).

116.

See generally A. SCHIFF, FIRE AND WATER: SCIENTIFIC HERESY IN THE
FOREST SERVICE (1962); See also Our Unavailable Public Lands, 26 THE NATION 288
(1978); 21 CONG. REc. 2537-38 (1880); CONG. REc. 2925-29 (1872); H.R. 2075, 44th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1876); S. Exec. Doc. 28, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. (1874); S. Exec. Doc. 36,
51st Cong., 1st Sess. (1890), for a sampling of the forest/water discussions.
117. Weeks Act of March 1, 1911; 36 Stat. 961 (1911). See SCHIFF, supra note 106,
at ch.4.
118. See S. OLSON, THE DEPLETION MYTH: A HISTORY OF THE RAILROAD USE OF
TIMBER (1971). Chapter 1 contains an important discussion of fears of timber famine.
119. FERNOW, supra note 106, at 168. For a colorful history of the migration of
the logging industry, see S. HOLBROOK. HOLY OLD MACKINAW: A NATURAL HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN LUMBERJACK (1938).
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that the vast wilderness and inexhaustible supply of raw materials
beyond the Appalachians (the Mississippi, the Missouri, and the
Rockies) were gone.
The Timber Culture Act of 1873 was the first congressional attempt to deal with the causes of growing public alarm. The Timber
Culture Act offered to donate 160 acres of public land to any person
who would plant 40 acres of trees and keep them growing for 10
years.'20 This Act occasioned flagrant land frauds,1 ' and it was
amended numerous times amidst growing discussion of the forest
problem. It was repealed by the 1891 General Land Law Revision.
Nonetheless, tree planting was the first general response to the
burgeoning recognition of the value of trees. It is not coincidental
that the Arbor Day tradition was begun in 1872 in Nebraska.
Following the temporary preoccupation with planting trees, Congress began to entertain a variety of proposals for dealing more comprehensively with forest issues. Three general categories of proposals stand out. First, a miscellaneous set of proposals include such
diverse and unconnected ideas as establishing a forestry school in
the Dakota territories, establishing a forest experiment station, and
establishing a commission or appointing a commissioner to investigate forestry matters. 12 The latter was approved in 1876 as a
rider on an appropriation funding the distribution of experimental
seeds. The 1876 action gave rise to the Division of Forestry in the
Department of Agriculture. The Division later developed into the
Bureau of Forestry, which became Gifford Pinchot's first governmental affiliation in 1898.122
The other two categories of proposals are more indicative of the
general direction of congressional discussions in the 1870's and
1880's. The concern with watersheds and water was expressed in a
variety of proposals for reservation and preservation of forests on
the public domain, appurtenant to navigable rivers, or in particular
watersheds. Timber supply and availability issues were associated
with calls to classify timberlands and either establish a sales system
or a sales reservation system.
Shortly after the Timber Culture Act passed, the first of many
reservation proposals was introduced. In 1876, Representative
Granberry Fort of Illinois introduced "a bill for the preservation of
the forests of the national domain adjacent to the sources of the
navigable rivers and other streams of the United States.' 2 ' The pro120.
121.
122.
proposals.
123.
124.

See DANA, supra note 106, at 383.
See P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 400 (1968).
See FERNOW, supra note 106, at 194-202 for a partial listing of legislative
See DANA, supra note 106, at 81-86; PINCHOT, supra note 106, at 26, 130-45.
H.R. 2074, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. (1876).
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posal was not seriously considered; but from that time forward, one
and sometimes several bills calling for the reservation and preservation of public forests were constantly before Congress.
Simultaneously, numerous measures were introduced regarding
timber, the prevention of fraud, monopoly and theft in obtaining
timber for domestic and commercial uses. Most of these proposals
were directed at remedying chicanery encouraged by the fact that
there was simply no legal way to obtain timber off the public domain. There were no provisions for selling timber without the land,
but following cessation of the sales system in the 1840s, the only
way to acquire the land was to pre-empt or homestead it. Forested
lands were generally not suitable for agriculture and were entered
fraudently only for purposes of stripping the timber. In an editorial
comment on John Wesley Powell's "Report on the Lands of the Arid
Region" of the United States, the editors of The Nation complained:
The present laws, however, absolutely prohibit the honest
acquirement of any of these timber lands, because they are
not agricultural ....
An old system, contrived when all tracts
were taken as farms and the forests cleared as hindrance to
the main object, is wholly inapplicable where the timber constitutes their sole12 5 value, summer frosts rendering
agriculture hopeless.
Timberlands were then, and continue to be through the debates,
by definition, those forest lands not suited for agriculture. Until
1883, proposals to remedy the timberlands availability problem joined
the reservation proposals in the congressional hopper. Early versions reflect the general belief that the best way to protect the standing timber was to have it pass as rapidly as possible into private
hands. Later sales system proposals call for either selling publicdomain timber off tillable lands prior to committing the land to
agriculture entry, in order to return full value to the Treasury or
reserving timberlands unfit for agriculture in order to establish a
sales system in perpetuity or both. Several proposals, reminiscent of
the naval reserves, called for the reservation of valuable timber
species.' The reservation and sales in perpetuity system was frequently introduced at the behest of Bernard Fernow, forester in
charge of the Division of Forestry, and were characteristic of the
urgings of a small but significant segment of the forestry
movement.1" Still, the more typical approach to the forestry issue is
expressed in an 1883 editorial in The Nation:
125. Our Unavailable Public Lands, supra note 116.
126. H.R. 7509, 47th Cong., 2d Sess. (1883); H.R. 832, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1883);
H.R. 1241, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886).
127. H.R. 3306, 6054; S. 1476, 1779, 50th Cong. 1st Sess. (1888). See also H. Exec.
Doc. 242, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); Miller, supra note 106, at 145-51; note.
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The Government of the United States has clearly no more
concern in holding or managing forest property; than it has
in working unoccupied wheatfields, except so far as forests,
from their peculiar location, are essential to the preservation
of the important rivers of the country. . . . The forests of
Michigan or Louisiana may be exterminated, as have been
those of New England, without seriously affecting the nation
as a nation. Such forests will grow again if profit can be
found in growing them; but if the forests which guard the
flow of great rivers such as head among the Adirondacks or
the Sierras of California, the Alleghanies, or the Rocky
Mountains are destroyed, there is something more than a
local destruction of property. The steady flow of rivers is endangered, and widespread disturbances, threatening the
lives and property of persons living perhaps thousands of
miles from the forests upon which their safety depends, is
the result. It is clearly the duty of government, then, to
preserve in every possible way the great rivers of the country; and forest preservation is thus, under certain conditions,
a vital question: The prosperity of the nation, even, depends
upon it. So far then, as the forests affect the rivers, they
should be made the subject of national investigation and
preservation; but for no other reason should the government, either General or State, become a forester. Individuals
can grow timber, and take care of it when grown, better
than the government, and the less the government mixes
8
itself up with business of this nature, the better.""
After the Timber and Stone Act and the Free Timber Act passed
in 1878,"2 Congress began to emphasize the need to establish reservations to protect watersheds, and Congress considered reservations which allowed for no use of timber at all. This agitation for
land reservations from the public domain was expressed, in part, in
a growing movement within and without Congress for the reservation of parks. Congress made numerous reservations for park purposes prior to the passage of section 2 4 .1 The debate over park
reservations indicates that the park concept was seen, in part, as a
means of preserving forested watersheds.

128.

37

THE NATION

201 (1883).

129. Act of April 30, 1878; 20 Stat.. 46 (1878) (Timber and Stone Act); Act of June
7, 1878, 20 Stat. 88 (1878) (Free Timber Act). See GATES, supra note 121 at 550-55.
130. See text accompanying note 138 infra. Early reservations include Hot
Springs, Arkansas (1832, 1870); Yellowstone, Montana, Wyoming and Idaho (1872); and
Yosemite, California (1864); and Mackinac Island, Michigan (an 1875 reservation ceded
to the state in 1895. See R. LEE, FAMILY TREE OF THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE (1972)
for early park reserves discussion.
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The numerous measures concerning timber depletion, forest
reservations, park reservations and forest protection, and the
similarities between early parks and forest reservations give
substantial clues as to congressional intent regarding section 24.
Moreover, the whole history of the forest protection issue in the
nineteenth century is sufficient to indicate that Congress was not
taken by surprise by section 24. The forest reservation authority
was a familiar and much discussed proposal and its passage in 1891
cannot, conventional wisdom notwithstanding, be considered a
"fluke."
C. Section 24 and Its Immediate Origins
Section 24 of the 1891 General Land Law Revisions provides:
The President of the United States may, from time to time,
set apart and reserve, in any state or territory having public
lands wholly or in part covered with timber or undergrowth,
whether of commercial value or not, as public reservations,
and the President shall, by public proclamation, declare the
establishment of such reservations and the limits thereof.''
The standard interpretation of the Act is that it was a great victory
for scientific conservation,' but the purposes are mixed and on the
whole unrelated to scientific forest management. While it is true
that the 1891 statute repealed the Timber Culture Act and the
Preemption Act, two of the most abused public land statutes, it also
liberalized the provision of the Free Timber Act by allowing a
defendant to defend against a timber trespass action by showing
that the "cut and removed timber" was for agricultural use.
The major referent in treating the 1891 Act as a scientific conservation landmark is section 24. Yet the familiar assumption that
the forest reserves were intended for timber management appears,
upon closer inspection, to be untrue. The construction of section 24
is made difficult not because it was not discussed in Congress; as we
have demonstrated, the idea had a long history. The provision has
been opened to misrepresentation because the text is grammatically
awkward; the sentence quoted above contains no direct object, so it
is not clear what is reserved.
An examination of proposed and enacted legislation which
preceded the adoption of section 24, however, supports the argument that the purpose was not to authorize forest management, but
that forest reservations were intended to be, literally, preserves
withheld from use in order to protect the public interest. Although
Congress did not speak in great detail about the purpose of section

131.
132.

16 U.S.C. § 471 (1976).
See text accompanying note 106, supra.
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24 forest reservations,'33 the purpose of park reservations had been
clear for twenty years. Neither Congress nor anyone else made
distinctions between forest and park preserves between 1870-91. In
short, the purpose was to preserve forests by withdrawing them
from entry and preventing use and occupancy. Contemporaneous
statements by those charged with administering the Act confirm
that preservation was the purpose of Congress.'"
Two significant antecedents of section 24 are section 8 of the
1888 General Land Law Revision and 1890 legislation creating parks
in California through the forest reservation procedure.'35 Legislation
considered in 1888 provided for timber classification and sale in sections 2-7. A system of forest reserves separate from the timber
management areas was included in section 8 which provided:
The President of the United States may from time to time
set apart and reserve in any State or Territory having
public lands bearing forests, any part of the public lands
designated as timber lands, or any lands wholly or in part
covered with timber or undergrowth, whether of commercial
value or not, as public reservations, on which the tree and
undergrowth shall be protected from waste or injury under
the charge of the Secretary of the Interior; and the President shall by public proclamation, declare the establishment
of such reservations and the limits thereof, and may employ
such portion of the military forces as may be necessary or
practible in protecting such or any other reservations, or
any other public timber land from waste or injury; and all
the provisions of this Act, or of any law touching the public
domain which relates to timber lands, shall be subordinate to
this section."

133. An inconclusive debate on the section was resolved by assurances that
presidential abuse of the withdrawal authority could be corrected by Congress.
134. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, H. EXEC. Doc. No. -,
52
Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1891); see also, R. NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND

133 (1967); Miller, supra note 106, at 288-300.
135. See text accompanying note 138 infra.
136. See H.R. 7901, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888). The 1888 legislation contained
two parts of relevance to the forest reserves question. Sections 4-7 establish a comprehensive timber classification and sales program, and section 8 dealt with forest
reserves entirely separately from the timber sale program. The 1888 proposals contemplated only limited use and management on the section 4-7 lands and none
whatever on the section 8 lands. The Chairman of the Public Lands Committee rejected the intense and expensive management schemes long advocated by Fernow and
his colleagues. These proposals were contained in the "Hale" bill see note 126 supra,
which were bypassed in favor of the Committee's General Land Law Revision. The bill
died in the Senate after it passed the House. See Miller, supra note 106, at 222-229; 19
CONG. REC. 2456-63, 5553-73, 5585-5607, 5627-28 (1923) for key parts of the debate and
Miller's useful commentary on the whole bill.
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It is possible that section 24 was a hasty edit of this earlier section, as the elimination of the discussion of commercial timber would
eliminate the direct object of "set apart and reserve." Less
speculatively, it is significant to note that timber management and
sales provisions were separate from section 8 forest reservations
and were not a part of the land law revision which passed in 1891.
Subsequent indication of congressional intent regarding section
24 comes from legislative and administrative activities affecting
California national parks. In 1890, Congress created Sequoia Park.
One week later, a bill reserving what is now part of Yosemite
National Park, "to set apart certain tracts of lands in the State of
California as forest reservations," passed both houses of Congress
without debate.' 7
Both acts are patterned explicitly after the Yellowstone legislation of 1872 and include language authorizing the Secretary to promulgate regulations which "shall provide for the preservation from injury of all timber, mineral deposits, natural curiosities or wonder."
The Secretary must also "provide against the wanton destruction of
fish and game within the reservation." Miller sums up the confusion
concerning the California reservations:
Like Yellowstone, the California reservations remained in a
kind of administrative twilight zone. Unlike Yellowstone,
they were not all public parks. Two and five-sevenths of the
three 'parks' were designated by Congress as 'reserved
forest lands.' The Secretary of the Interior called them national parks in his 1890 annual report, and a recent history
of the national parks declares 'That they were considered by
Congress to be national parks is evident by the language of
the two bills, identical to that of the Yellowstone Act of
1872.' The language was similar but not identical. If they
were all supposed to be national parks, why did the House
Public Lands Committee substitute H.R. 12187 [the bill that
created the Yosemite forest reservation] for H.R. 8350, the
bill that would have created a Yosemite National Park? ...
Yosemite Valley was owned by the State of California,
though it was often called a national park; it was surrounded
by a congressionally-designated area of reserved forest
lands, called a national park by the Secretary of the Interior,
which was patrolled by U.S. Army troops, sent there
without proper authorization.'
Both the Secretary of the Interior, charged with administering
both the forest and park reserves, and Bernard Fernow, the only
137. H.R. 12178, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. (1890). The legislation passed both houses
of Congress without comment. __
CONG. REC. 10740, 51-52 (1890).
138. Miller, supra note 106, at 288-300.
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professional forester in government at the time, viewed section 24
as setting up reservations, not as management charters. Fernow's
1891 Report of the Division of Forestry described section 24 as having a primary economic objective-the provision of continuous forest
cover and the equalization of downstream flows. The secondary objective, according to Fernow, was "to secure places of retreat for...
health, recreation, and pleasure." ' 8 Although he was a leading
contemporary advocate of forest management, Fernow recognized
where the Supreme Court did not, that aesthetic preservation and
recreation were important purposes of the forest reservations.
Fernow's partisan priorities, however, were rejected by the Interior
Secretary and the President in designating and administering the
reserves. Secretary Noble clearly viewed the purpose of the
reserves as the reservation of park or quasi-park areas. The initial
reserve proclaimed under the new authority was an expansion of
Yellowstone National Park and many other early forest reserves
were established at the behest of local park advocates."' There is
some evidence that he thought further congressional action would
be necessary to give the forest reserves full national park status. In
his 1891 annual report, the Secretary made quite clear that even absent further legislation the forest reserves were to be managed as
parks: "It is to be considered also that these parks will preserve the
fauna, fish and flora of our country, and become resorts for the people
seeking instruction and recreation ...
,1
Thus, although Congress did not speak directly of purposes of
lands reserved under section 24 of the 1891 Act, it is possible to put
together a coherent picture of congressional intent from a variety of
data. In 1888, Congress specifically segregated timber sales and
management from forest reservations. In 1890, Congress established
forest reservations in California and raised no protest when they
were administered by the Secretary as national parks. The basic
theme of the Secretary's concept of a national park is, moreover,
supported by over 20 years of congressional discussion of both
forest and park policy: preserve the watersheds. Related themes,
consistant with 20 years of congressional discussions of reservation
policy and clear administrative policy include public recreation and
preservation of the "fauna, fish and flora" and national and scenic
wonders as objectives of both park and forest reservations. The
park-forest distinction upon which the Court's decision in New
Mexico relies so heavily simply did not exist in the 1890's."2
139.
III, supra
140.
141.
Cong., 1st
142.

FERNOW, REPORT OF THE DIVISION OF FORESTERY FOR 1891 (cited in A. ROGERS

note 106 at 157).
See Rakestraw, infra note 143.
H. EXEC. Doc. No. 52
Sess. 14-15 (1891).
The uses which many proposed for the forest reserves do not, contrary to
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,
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D. The Background of the 1897 Legislation
The key assumption of the majority opinion that there are two
and only two purposes of the 1897 legislation rests on the theory
that Congress rejected federal control over forests except for
limited purposes designed to benefit the West. This assumption
adopts the overly simplistic theory that western opposition to the
withdrawal of some 38.5 million acres by Presidents Harrison and
Cleveland" 8 caused such an uproar in the West that Congress abandoned the broad discretion conferred in section 24 of the Creative
Act. 14 A complete reading of the historical record shows that, of
course, westerners were concerned about the forest reservations.
The controversy, however, focused on the issue of uses permitted on
reservations rather than on opposition to the general idea of forest
reservations.1"" Western irrigation interests were, in fact, more oppospresent-day conceptions, contradict the point regarding the similarity between forests
and parks. Many of the uses urged for the forest reserves were permitted in parks as
well, and the restrictions on use in the forest reservations (all use of any kind was prohibited) were much more stringent than park use standards. For example, in 1881,
Secretary of the Interior S. J. Kirkwood approved rules for Yellowstone National Park
which forbade cutting of timber and forbade removing mineral deposits without the
supervisor's permission. The regulations, however, allowed hunting, trapping and
fishing for purposes of securing food (as opposed to hunting for sport) but forbade the
selling of intoxicating liquors: see RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, NA,
P&M, LS, 1872-1886 Cited in D. HAMPTON. HOW THE U.S. CAVALRY SAVED OUR NATIONAL PARKS 49-50 (1971); when the army took responsibility for park protection in 1886,
the rules were amended to forbid mining altogether; the cutting of green timber; hunting,
trapping and discharging of firearms; fishing with hook and line; and, except by hotel proprietors, the selling of intoxicating liquors. Livestock was allowed except that stock
was not permitted to run loose in the vicinity of the various points of interest frequented by visitors; see S. Exec. Doc. 40, 49th Cong., 2d Sess., Appendix A at 7.
143. Between 1891 and 1893, Presidents Harrison and Cleveland withdrew
seventeen reserves totalling over 17.5 million acres. The process by which these early
reserves were studied and designated was extensive and elaborate. It compares
favorably with the inadequately studied designations made later by Cleveland (1897)
and Roosevelt (1907) which, unlike the early reserves, aroused extensive hostility. For
a copy of the rules which the General Land Office followed in studying and evaluating
the reserves, see 29 CONG. REC. 2514-15 (1897). See B. RAKESTRAW. A. HISTORY OF
FOREST CONSERVATION IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST: 1891-1913 at 42-46 (1955) (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Washington) for an extensive discussion of early reserve
designations. In 1897, President Cleveland precipitously added 21 million acres to the
reserved forest areas. Coming without warning or consultation, the "Cleveland
Reserves" did indeed engender hostility.
144. In the Monongahela litigation, Izaak Walton League v. Butz, 497 F.2d 849 (8th
Cir. 1974) courts accepted the plaintiff's argument that the 1897 Act was a restriction
on the authority granted in the 1891 Act and, therefore, had to specifically be rescinded rather than altered by implication. Although the authorities granted in the 1897
Act are narrow, especially in the timber management area, they do not limit the 1891
grant. The simple truth is that in neither the West Virginia nor the New Mexico cases
did the Court even inquire into the 1891 Act. Had it done so, a more accurate assessment of the 1891 and 1897 statutes might have been forthcoming.
145. The congressional discussion of the Cleveland reserves are instructive on
this point. Despite legitimate outrage, bordering on hysteria in much of the western
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ed to allowing any use of the reserves than were eastern forest management advocates such as Fernow.
Between 1892 and 1895, Congress methodically stepped back
from the absolute prohibition on the use of reserves, but it did not
abandon the concept of forest preservation. The conclusion which
follows from congressional activity during this period is that Congress was nearly unanimous in the need to preserve forests in order
to preserve the watersheds. There was also growing acceptance of
the idea that withholding the forest reserves entirely from use was
both unnecessary and unwise. By 1895, Congress had virtually decided
to authorize the Secretary to permit those uses which could be
regulated to the extent that they did not threaten the watershed
protection purpose. The act which finally passed in 1897 does not
revoke or limit the authority that seems to have been delegated in the
1891 legislation.
This conclusion is supported by legislative activity in Congress
between 1892 and 1897 and the broad purpose of the Organic Act.
Successive drafts of the 1897 legislation demonstrate that Congress
was trying to strike a balance between preservation and use by
carefully regulating use and occupancy. Regulated use, the majority
came ultimately to believe, might occur without harming the forest
cover. In the terms of the Court's decision in New Mexico, "preserving and protecting the forest" is the dominant theme of the reservation authority in 1897, as it was in 1891. It is separate from the two
purposes, which Mr. Justice Rehnquist urges are synonymous, providing for favorable conditions of water flow and a continuous supply
of timber. In 1892, Congress considered and rejected legislation
which expressly limited the purposes of the reserves to the two urged
by the majority." 6 Through a series of proposals and modifications,
Congress arrived at a carefully worded set of provisions which
would insure the objects of such reservations, namely "to regulate
and use and to preserve the forests thereon from
their occupancy
1 47
destruction.'

press, congressional reaction was moderate and generally supportive of the resource
concept. See 29 CONG. REc. 2513, 2515, 2516, 2678, 2903, 2971-73 see also note 149 infra.
146. The Paddock Bill, S.3235, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. (1892) employed the same
language as the proposals Mr. Justice Rhenquist used to support his two-purpose
reading of the act, and the Paddock Bill was rejected.
147. See note 6, supra. The majority entirely overlooked this definition of
reserve purposes found in section 24 of the act. In its straining to achieve a twopurpose rather than three-purpose interpretation of the statement of purpose in the
section which it chose to interpret, the Court was, moreover, forced to adopt a meaning of the term "or" which is better achieved by eliminating the word altogether.
Given the care and attention with which Congress phrased and rephrased the section,
the Court should not have ignored so obviously critical a word.

19791

UNITED STA TES V NEW MEXICO

The focus of much of the debate on the evolving "McRae Bill"
concerned whether to allow harvest of reserve timber. Congressman McRae of Arkansas, sponsor of the bill and one of very few
Congressional advocates of timber harvesting and management, was
forced over a period of several years to severely restrict his initially
expansive version of permitted harvests. "8 In a series of modifications and amendments made during debate on the bill, Congress limited timber cutting to dead or mature trees. Moreover, it
authorized the Secretary to designate, appraise and sell timber
specifically "for the purpose of preserving the living and growing
timber and promoting the younger growth of natural forests."
Only trees interfering with young growth could be removed, a
provision which led to successful litigation in the mid-1970's challenging Forest Service harvesting practices. Although the basic issues
involved in balancing forest use and protection had been resolved,
the legislation did not pass in 1895. Congressman McRae was absent
due to family illness when the Conference Committee Report was
due to be presented in the House, and the bill died. Several events
which intervened before the bill passed in 1897 have confused subsequent observers and the Supreme Court.
President Cleveland declined to establish any
further forest
reservations beyond the 13 million acres which had been designated
by 1893. The General Land Office had neither the personnel nor the
resources to enforce the strict prohibitions on use, and the declarations therefore had made no positive impact on the forests ostensably protected. In 1896, after the McRae bill died in the Fifty-third
Congress, the Secretary of the Interior requested the National
Academy of Science to propose a rational policy for administration
of the reserves. Further congressional action on the issue awaited
NAS recommendations. Although the Secretary expected a report in
two weeks, a Special Committee appointed by the Academy studied
and debated for nearly two years. Sensing a need for dramatic
Presidential action to brake the "stalemate" in Congress, the Committee made its recommendations in two parts. First, it recommended
that thirteen new reserves be declared. Western opposition would,
the Committee hoped, create an atmosphere in which Congress
148. Congressman McRae was forced by Congress to accept language which
restricted timbercutting to dead or mature trees and the restrictive purpose limitations were removed. Mr. Justice Rhenquist relied on Congressman McRae's remarks to
support his arguments concerning the distinction between forest and park purposes.
This is a misleading reference because McRae, as the leading advocate of scientific
forestry in the Congress and the only person knowledgeable about silviculture and the
only one to see it as distinct from park management, was also forced to significantly
modify his position during debate on the 1897 legislation. His views are not, therefore,
to be taken as the sense of Congress on that point. See Miller, supra note 106, at 296;
see also Smith, The Appalachian National Park Movement, 1885-1901, 37 N.C. HIST.
REv. 33, 64 (1960).
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would act favorably upon the recommended forest policy, which was
alleged to be forthcoming. On Washington's Birthday, 1897, President Cleveland added the thirteen new reserves, totalling approximately 21 million acres, and congressional response was so rapid
that the Committee's recommendations arrived after the issue had
been resolved.
President Cleveland's 1897 Washington's Birthday reserves
aroused tremendous western hostility," 9 in principle part because
the boundaries were drawn with insufficient study and without consulting a single representative from the affected areas. Western
outrage was, however, widely shared in the East. Congress considered various proposals to vacate the reservation order, but
legislative action taken in the face of Cleveland's ill-advised move
was restrained. Congress merely passed a bill authorizing the President to modify or revoke a reserve. Cleveland, however, refused to
sign the measure. Because it was a rider on the appropriations bill,
newly inaugurated President McKinley was obliged to call a special
session of Congress to deal with fiscal and forestry matters.

149. The President's Washington's Birthday reserve created a wave of bitter
outrage and hostility in Congress and in the Western press. Unlike the previous
reserves, the boundaries were not carefully drawn but, rather, included whole towns,
villages, farms, mines, mills, and thousands of inhabitants. The NAS committee which
recommended the reserves had not even visited five of them, and there was no consultation with representatives from the affected areas and no opportunity for local
citizens to become informed of or comment on the proposals. The entire Congress was
aware that the reserves were unreasonable, but western representatives were particularly dissatisfied. Editorial reaction in western newspapers was dyspeptic. Some
people feared that the outcry threatened both the reserve concept and the careful and
promising compromises of the third session of the Fifty-third Congress.
There is,however, a striking difference between the fulminations which filled the
popular press and the measured response which Congress enacted in the wake of
President Cleveland's ill-advised action. The Senate considered and passed a measure
to restore to entry the Cleveland Reserves less than a week after the reserves were
proclaimed. See 29 CONG. REc. 2512-17 (1897). The House rushed through a revised version of the McRae Bill which included authorization for the President "to modify or
vacate" any order creating a reserve. There was considerable debate as to whether
the President already had that authority, but in the end the House accepted Public
Lands Committee Chairman Lacey's proposal. I& at 2677-80. The Conference Committee on the appropriations bill agreed to an amendment bill which simply adopted the
last phrases of the Lacey proposal which authorized the President to modify or revoke
a reserve.
It is commonly assumed that Congress became so enraged at the Cleveland
Reserves that they sought, by the 1897 Act, to limit his authority to set aside lands.
See ISE, supra note 106. The record does not support that contention. Given the enormity of Cleveland's action, the response of Congress can only be viewed as a model of
restraint and support for the reserves. President Cleveland, however, apparently considered the amendment to the appropriations bill unacceptable. With the new president literally arriving at the door of the inaugural ceremonies, Cleveland refused to sign
the bill. See generally, Miller, supra note 106 at 228-246; Kirkland supra note 106, at
307-333.
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The Organic Act passed again as a rider on an appropriations
bill in June, 1897. The measure suspended the Cleveland reserves
for a year but in other pertinent parts was essentially similar to the
1895 McRae bill. Surprisingly, the Act appears to rule out forestry,
as presently conceived, since most harvesting was precluded. Following the 1895 compromise, only the cutting and selling of those trees
which must be removed in order to protect the forest or promote
the younger growth is clearly within the purposes of the Act.
Manipulation of the forest cover in order to produce preferred
species or preferred quality of trees, improved stocking, or growth
rates is not allowed. The supply of timber that the forests were to
produce was conceived to be continuous but not voluminous: the supply
would be perpetual but limited in amount to those trees whose continued presence threatened the forest or the young growth. The only
possibility for extensive logging in a forest reserve would occur
when a stand of trees was, in some way, threatening to the forest.
This might include trees which were vulnerable to fire, insect attacks, or other forms of disease or pest which threatened the young
growth. It is not sufficient justification, according to the Act, to
have a tree or stand of trees rotting or about to burn. They cannot
be cut or sold unless the burning or rotting threatens younger
growth. Hence, the 1897 Act authorizes not silviculture, or timber
management, but only those uses of the forest which will not impair
the watershed protection and future growth of the forest.
For the issue of reserved rights the message of the 1897 Act is
that the reserves are established in order to regulate use of the
forests therein. The Court's "two purpose" argument is clearly
without merit because it ignores the important tension Congress
perceived between use and preservation. Mr. Justice Rhenquist has
argued that "to preserve and protect the forest" is synonymous
with "securing favorable conditions of waterflow and to furnish a
continuous supply of timber." The congressional concerns, however,
reflected both in the debate and the plain language of the bill
demonstrate that Congress believed that timber harvest was antithetical to, rather than synonymous with preserving the forest. Mr.
Justice Rhenquist also ignored the clear statutory language which
authorized the Secretary to regulate timber harvest and all other
uses; literally, "to insure the objects of such reservations, namely, to
regulate their occupancy and use and to preserve the forests
thereon from destruction." 1
VI. IMPACT OF THE DECISION ON FUTURE
RESERVED RIGHT CLAIMS ON PUBLIC LANDS
United States v. New Mexico construed two acts authorizing the
establishment and use of forest reservations, but the opinion has im150.

30 Stat. 11 (1897).
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plications for a variety of other non-Indian reserved rights claims.
The final section of this article examines the narrow as well as the
broad impact of the decision.
A. National Forests
To restate the holding, reserved rights may not be claimed for
fish and wildlife protection and recreation under the 1891 and 1897
legislation. The only purpose for which reserved rights may be
claimed under the majority opinion is timber preservation, and
under our analysis this purpose does not extend to silviculture
generally. The majority's short list is not, however, exhaustive. An
Idaho Supreme Court opinion rendered just before the United
States Supreme Court's decision suggests that a narrow reading of
the two acts will encompass two other uses,151 although the practical
significance of the Idaho reading is conjectural.
Two cases involving Forest Service claims to the entire natural
flow of a stream, including seasonable variations, reached the Idaho
Supreme Court shortly after Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v.
Salopek'52 was decided in New Mexico. In both Idaho cases, a district
court allowed the government's claims, and in Avondale Irrigation
District v. North Idaho Properties" the district court required the
claim to be quantified. The state supreme court reversed both
district courts on the issue on federal instream flows, adopting the
Mimbres Valley reasoning. Avonable Irrigation District did,
however, reach two issues not considered in Mimbres Valley and
broadened slightly the uses for which a federal claim may be valid.
In one Idaho case, the district court had disallowed federal claims
for fire prevention and erosion control, and the supreme court
disagreed but did not reverse since there was no evidence of the
need for these two uses. This dicta has strong support in the
legislative history of the 1897 Act, but it seems unlikely that much
water can in fact be claimed for these two purposes.
The more interesting issue addressed by the Idaho Supreme
Court was whether a valid non-consumptive reserved right-for the
limited purposes allowed by the Idaho and United States Supreme
Courts-must be quantified where state law so requires. The
McCarren Act, under which state courts acquire jurisdiction over
federal claims, has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to require state courts to apply the federal substantive law of reserved
rights. Under this rule, questions of volume and scope are matters
of federal substantive law. The line between substance and pro151.
9 (1978).
152.
153.

Avondale Irrigation Distr. v. North Idaho Properties, 98 Idaho 30, 577 P.2d
90 N.M. 410, 564 P.2d 615 (1977).
98 Idaho 30, 577 P.2d 9 (1978).
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cedure is, of course, not self-defining, and the imposition of state law
on the theory that the issue is merely procedural could become an
effective means of diminishing the allowable scope of federal reserved
rights. To avoid undue interference with federal claims, the majority, over a dissent, applied Idaho law in a manner which avoided a
conflict with a possible federal common law rule that the government need not quantify its non-consumptive claims. Avondale Irrigation District stands for the proposition that a non-consumptive
"claim to the entire flow, if it is proved to be necessary,"'" is a sufficient quantification of the reserved rights claimed in the two cases.
The majority opinion also seems to foreclose reserved rights
claims under the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act, but this part of
the opinion is dictum as the issue was not before the Court.
Moreover, the majority opinion is bad dictum for it reflects a too
restrictive approach to the standard of implied intent to reserve.
Given the federal government's constitutional power to administer
the public lands in light of changing conditions,155 it would be
reasonable to presume that Congress has delegated the authority to
reserve water when a federal statute with respect to withdrawn
public lands contemplates a water-related use. Such a presumption
would be rebuttable in light of a long history of congressional desire
to accomodate state and federal claims. A presumption in favor of
federal reserved rights is a logical extension of Supreme Court
precedents recognizing the relationship between land and water use
in the West. Moreover, a presumption is subject to two limitations
which recognize state interests in certainty with regard to water
allocation. First, the Court's opinion in Cappaert properly suggests
that the federal government is entitled to only the minimum amount
of water necessary to accomplish the purpose of the reservation. Second, state interests are not without representation in Congress, and
there is little that a court might do to recognize federal interests
that cannot be corrected by Congress should it disagree with a decision. The public trust does not compel any fixed allocation of land
and water resources.
B. Other Withdrawn Lands
Other agencies, such as the Department of the Interior, often
claim reserved rights for national parks, monuments and fish and
wildlife refuges, and prior cases have recognized reserved rights for
these lands. The majority opinion in New Mexico, however, casts
some doubt on the success of such claims where Congress does not
expressly indicate that water is necessary to support the land use.

154. Id. at 41, 577 P.2d at 20.
155. See generally Sax, Helpless Giants: The NationalParks and the Regulation
of Private Lands, 75 MICH. L. REV. 239, 260-62 (1976).
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To support its denial of the Forest Service's claim in New Mexico,
the Court noted a distinction between the National Park Service
enabling legislation and the two forest acts. The former was said to
evidence a broader purpose as compared to forest withdrawals. As
we have argued, the distinction between parks and forests only
became clear after the 1905 legislation. Even granting the majority's
premise, it should follow that congressional intent to reserve water
should be more readily inferred in the case of parks, monuments and
wildlife refuges. In an apparent effort to foreclose an argument based
on the park/forest distinction, the Court in a footnote indicated that
the opinion expressed no views "as to what, if any, water"1" Congress intended to reserve under the enabling legislation creating the
national parks. Parts of the opinion went further and suggested that
all minimum flow claims must be based on express water-related
withdrawals. The geographical position of most national parks
makes the question of intent to reserve of limited interest because
there will be few upstream appropriators to contest a reserved
rights claim. The issue is important for national monuments and
wildlife refuges. Because of the close connection between water and
the purpose of the reservation, Mr. Justice Rehnquist's offhand footnote ought not to be construed as a repudiation of the holdings in
Arizona v. California and Cappaert v. United States recognizing
reserved rights for these uses.
C. Stockwatering and Other Reserved Rights
Reserved rights were also claimed for stockwatering purposes,
but the Court rejected these claims. If the Court had upheld the
claim, the door would have been opened to the argument that all
federal permits to use public lands carry with them reserved rights.
United States v. New Mexico is the first Supreme Court opinion to
consider this question so the Court's analysis of the claim has implications beyond the narrow issue of stockwatering. The Court rejected the stockwatering claim on three grounds: (1) stockwatering
was not a direct purpose of the reservation of forests; (2) there was
no evidence in the legislative history of the need to allocate water
for stockwatering purposes; and (3) the intent of Congress would not
be defeated if stockwatering could not take place.157 An argument
could be made that a major reason for the 1897 legislation was to
protect forests from destructive grazing, and thus water should be
reserved to allow the Forest Service to regulate grazing use of the
forest.l But, access can be controlled directly so there may be little
need to imply federal water rights for this purpose.
156.
157.

-U.S.

at

__,

98 S.Ct. at-.

Id. at , 98 S.Ct. at 3022.
158. The legislative history shows that Congress clearly and explicitly recognized
livestock use of the forests as a major threat to the forest cover. Controlling
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The rationale for denying reserved rights for stockwatering permits does not necessarily apply to permits to develop natural
resources such as geothermal and oil shale since the purpose of the
reservation is energy development. Nonetheless, the result should
be the same in both cases. In United States v. District Court for
Water Division No. 5,'59 the Supreme Court suggested that reserved
rights could be claimed by the Department of the Navy for its oil
and petroleum reserves. There is, however, an important distinction
between reserved rights claimed by a federal agency and those
claimed by a private party acting under federal permission. In the
first situation, the federal agency's mission may require an allocation of water different from that allowed under state law. Thus,
there is a need to construe water-related withdrawals as carrying
appurtenant rights unless Congress expressly disclaims such an intention. Perhaps the same could be said of federal permittees on the
theory that they are carrying out a federal function. Generally,
however, federal permits are issued for uses compatible with state
water law. The broad rationale of the Court's disposition of the
stockwatering issue is that there is no need to place federal
livestock is quite clearly one of the purposes for which the reserves were established.
The record of the debates in Congress, the regulations adopted by administrators implementing congressional directives, and the popular press of the day all testify to this
universally held understanding of the forest reserves. McRae wearily summed up the
bill at the final debate before passage in the Fifty-third congress:
I have repeatedly discussed this bill, and I do not desire to take up time now.
It is, however, intended to provide a sensible method for preventing forest
fires, for keeping the cattle and sheep from destroying the young growth,
and for much use of the ax as will help and not hurt the forest.
27 Cong. Rec. 364 (1894).
The need to protect the reserves from grazing was noted immediately and often
by successive Secretaries of the Interior, Commissioners of the General Land Office,
and Heads of the Division of Forestry. The very first regulations issued regarding the
reserves following the 1891 Act "prohibited" the driving, feeding, grazing, pasturing,
or herding of cattle, sheep, or other livestock "within any of the reserves." See
Roberts, supra note 106, at 21. Moreover, the very first regulations issued pursuant to
the 1897 Act prohibited the entrance of sheep or cattle into any of the reserves. The
Report of the Commissioner of the General Land Office for 1898 noted that "next to
fires, sheep grazing constitutes the most serious difficulty to be considered in administering the reserves." It was necessary, however, to prohibit pasturing of sheep in
all the reserves except those in Washington and Oregon because sheep grazing "has
been found injurious to the forest cover." He noted, however, that "special efforts
have been directed toward ascertaining the particular regions in which the conditions
are such as to demand the exclusion of sheep, and toward acquiring information
necessary to a determination of the nature of restriction required to regulate sheep
grazing in other regions." After studying the matter, the Commissioner had rescinded
the prohibition on all livestock and permitted cattle generally "so long as it appears
that injury is not being done to the forest growth." Report of the Commissioner of the
General Land Office 53d 3d 87-88 (1898).
159. 401 U.S. 527 (1971). See Holland, Mixing Oil and Water: The Effect of
Prevailing Water Law Doctrines on Oil Shale Development, 52 DENVER L.J. 657,
682-690 (1975).
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licencees and permittees on a different footing from state appropriators unless Congress expressly so states. Even if Congress
wants to further the federal purpose by overriding state law, the
fairer method of accomplishing this objective is to invoke the
Supremacy Clause. A federal permittee would not be bound by state
law but would have to compensate any water right holders whose
rights were taken by the exercise of the federal lease or permit.
D. How Can Federal Land Managers Claim Reserved
Rights for Instream Flows?
The answer to this question is, of course, that reserved rights
may be claimed under state law. A federal land management agency
may claim instream flow rights for public lands by filing for a state
appropriation permit. The federal government will be subject to the
procedures and substantive law of the state. All federal rights-if
granted-will have late priority dates. To many, this is a desirable
result. In light of the government's trust over the public lands and
the fragmented state law recognizing instream flow rights, we conclude that the federal government should not be left to state law to
claim water rights for fish and wildlife preservation and other
related purposes. Instead, the withdrawal of land for purposes which
are arguably water-related should be construed to carry with them
appurtenant water rights. Future federal-state adjustments should
come through congressional legislation defining more precisely the
scope of federal reserved rights.
A FINAL WORD
Throughout the West, United States v. New Mexico will be read,
along with California v. United States, as a major victory for state
control of western waters. On one level, this reading is right and the
cases are a welcome relief from the Supreme Court's simplistic
preference for federal control of water resources development.
Nevertheless, advocates of state control can take little heart from
New Mexico for the case is too flawed and hence unstable to have a
long term influence. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will
reverse itself on the narrow issue of the effect of the 1891 and 1897
acts, but it is by no means certain that the broad dicta and attitudes
which run through the opinion will prove a reliable guide to future
reserved rights controversies.

